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Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions (MMUCAs) are extensions of classical combina-
torial auctions (CAs) where bidders trade transformations of goods rather than just sets
of goods. Solving MMUCAs, i.e., determining the sequences of bids to be accepted by the
auctioneer, is computationally intractable in general. However, differently from classical
combinatorial auctions, little was known about whether polynomial-time solvable classes
of MMUCAs can be singled out on the basis of their characteristics. The paper ﬁlls this
gap, by studying the computational complexity of MMUCA instances under structural and
qualitative restrictions, which characterize interactions among bidders and types of bids
involved in the various transformations, respectively.
© 2013 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions (MMUCAs) are extensions of classical combinatorial auctions (CAs) where par-
ticipants are allowed to bid not only on bundles of goods to buy, but also on bundles of goods to sell and of transformations
of goods [1].
These mechanisms are particularly useful in the context of automatizing supply chain formation, where production pro-
cesses often emerge as the result of complex interactions among producers and consumers [2]. Indeed, in these contexts,
the auctioneer wants to obtain certain products based on the goods she initially owns, by exploiting a production process
possibly involving further goods to be acquired from suppliers or to be obtained via transformations operating on the goods
currently available to her.
Example 1.1. Consider the supply chain associated with the production of bicycles, which is illustrated in Fig. 1 according to
an intuitive graphical notation where goods are represented as ovals, transformations as boxes, and where arrows indicate
inputs and outputs of the various transformations. Assume that the auctioneer is presented with 6 different bids over the
singleton sets of transformations {t1}, {t2}, . . . , {t6}, whose associated prices are then reported in the boxes as well.
The assembly of a bicycle from its constituents (i.e., frame, brakes, drive train, front wheel, back wheel, seat, and handlebars)
is thus offered to the auctioneer through the bid over {t6}, which is sold for $10. However, the auctioneer owns only a subset
of such constituents (i.e., frame and brakes), plus two goods (i.e., chain and chainring) that are not immediately exploitable
by t6. The auctioneer has therefore to ask suppliers for the missing goods (i.e., front wheel, back wheel, seat, and handlebars),
which are made available trough the bids over {t3}, {t4}, and {t5}, for $10, $17, and $8, respectively. Note that t4 incidentally
produces a dynamo, which is not part of the bicycle the auctioneer is willing to produce. Finally, note that the auctioneer
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needs to accept one further bid (either over {t1} for $2, or over {t2} for $3) to assemble the chain and the chainrings into
the drive train, in order for the latter to be taken as input by t6. 
A solution to a MMUCA instance is, roughly, any set of bids whose transformations can be arranged in a sequence
allowing the auctioneer to produce the desired goods. Among all possible solutions, in the Winner-Determination problem
we are interested in singling out those having the minimum total cost or, equivalently, guaranteeing the maximum possible
revenue. For instance, it is easily seen that the minimum production cost in Example 1.1 is $29, which is witnessed by the
sequence of transformations t1, t4, t6.
The Winner-Determination problem for MMUCA instances has intensively been studied in recent years, by extending to
this novel setting several results originally conceived for classical CAs. In particular, languages have been deﬁned and ana-
lyzed which allow bidders to compose (atomic) bids in a natural and intuitive way [1], and motivated by their intractability
(formally, NP-hardness), solution approaches have been proposed (see, e.g., [3]) that well-behave on realistic scenarios [4].
Differently from classical CAs, however, little was known about whether polynomial-time solvable classes of MMUCAs can
be singled out based on the structural and topological properties of the instances at hand. As a matter of fact, by focusing
on the kinds of interactions among bidders that are likely to occur in practice, classes of instances over which Winner-
Determination is tractable—called “islands of tractability” in the literature—have been identiﬁed for classical CAs (such as
structured item graphs [5] or bounded hypertree-width dual hypergraphs [6]). However, none of these results had a counterpart
in the case of MMUCAs.
The aim of this paper is precisely to ﬁll this gap, by depicting a clear and complete picture of the frontier of tractability
for MMUCA instances, with respect to both qualitative and structural parameters. In particular, note that the existence of a
solution is not guaranteed in the case of MMUCAs. For instance, in Example 1.1, if the auctioneer does not initially own the
frame, then no solution exists at all. Therefore, checking for the feasibility of the production process is an important and
peculiar source of complexity for MMUCA instances and, accordingly, attention will be focused not only on the Winner-
Determination but also on the Feasibility problem of deciding whether a given instance admits a solution at all (no matter
of its cost).
Our contribution can be summarized as follows:
(1) We chart the tractability frontier of the Feasibility problem for MMUCAs under qualitative restrictions, i.e., under
restrictions characterizing the types of bids in terms of the variety and quantity of goods involved in the various
transformations. The analysis is carried out over three different bidding languages:
• Atomic bids, where each bid is just deﬁned over one set of transformations—this is the building block of the following
two languages;
• OR-language, where bidders submit sets of atomic bids and accept to implement any combination of them for the
sum of their prizes; and
• XOR-language, where each bidder accepts to implement at most one atomic bid from the set of hers submitted atomic
bids.
In particular, for the above bidding languages, we analyze the scenario where each underlying atomic bid is deﬁned
over a set containing one transformation only (as in Example 1.1), as well as the more general case where each atomic
bid is deﬁned over an arbitrary set of transformations.
(2) We study the complexity of Feasibility under structural restrictions of the networks originating from bidder interactions,
motivated by the fact that many NP-hard problems in different application areas are known to be eﬃciently solvable
when restricted to instances that can be modeled via (nearly)acyclic instances. Surprisingly, bad news emerged from
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only. In particular, this is the case for two natural ways of encoding bidder interactions, namely, for:
• transformations graphs, where nodes are in one-to-one correspondence with transformations and an edge indicates
that one transformation produces a good required by the other, and for
• goods graphs, where nodes are in one-to-one correspondence with goods and an edge indicates the possibility of
transforming a good into another.
(3) We study the complexity of the Winner-Determination problem on MMUCA instances, in order to single out tractable
classes of MMUCAs extending those deﬁned in [5,6] for CAs. To this end, we propose a notion of intricacy of an instance
and we deﬁne a hypergraph encoding for bidders interactions. The two concepts are designed to evidence the sources of
qualitative and structural intractability, respectively, which emerged in our analysis of the complexity of the Feasibility
problem. In fact, we show that on classes of instances with “small intricacy” and whose associated hypergraphs are
(nearly)acyclic, Winner-Determination can be solved in polynomial time.
Note that the analysis we carry out in this paper extends some preliminary results on the complexity of MMUCAs we
discussed in [7]. There, we focused in fact on atomic bids, in a setting where each bid is deﬁned over a set containing
one transformation, and where the free disposal assumption has been considered only. Moreover, the hypergraph-based
approach to encode interactions among bidders and the associated results are entirely novel contributions of this paper.
Organization The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reports a few preliminaries on MMUCAs. The complex-
ity of Feasibility under qualitative and structural restrictions is discussed in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively. Tractability
islands for the Winner-Determination problem are isolated in Section 5, and conclusions are drawn in Section 6.
2. Mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions
In this section, we recall some basic notions about MMUCAs, and we illustrate relevant results known in the literature
on this formalism.
2.1. Formal framework
Let G be a set of types of goods. Any function W : G → N will be hereafter equivalently viewed as a multi-set over
G containing W(g) repetitions of each good g ∈ G . As an example, W = {} denotes the function W : G → N such that
W(g) = 0, for each g ∈ G . Moreover, in order to manipulate such multi-sets, we shall use standard operators, such as ‘∩’,
‘∪’, ‘\’, ‘⊆’, and ‘=’, under their usual semantics. For instance, {g, g} \ {g} = {g} and {g, g} ∩ {g} = {g}.
A transformation over G is a tuple 〈I,O〉 where I : G → N (resp., O : G → N) is a function mapping each good g ∈ G
to the quantity required (resp., produced) for the transformation to take place (resp., as a result of the transformation). If
I = {} (resp., O = {}), then the transformation is just meant at offering (resp., requesting) some goods.
An atomic bid over G is a triple b = 〈B, p, type〉, where B is a multi-set of transformations over G and where p ∈ R
is the payment the bidder is willing to make in return for being allocated all transformations in B or any subset B′ ⊆ B,
depending on whether type= full or type= partial, respectively. Note that if p < 0, then the auctioneer must actually pay
−p to the bidder in order for her to implement the transformations.
A mixed multi-unit combinatorial auction instance over atomic bids is a tuple A = 〈G,B,Uin,Uout〉, where G is a set of
goods, B is a multi-set of atomic bids over G , and Uin : G →N (resp., Uout : G →N) is a function denoting the quantities of
goods the auctioneer holds to begin with (resp., expects to end up with).
Deﬁnition 2.1 (Solutions). Let B′ ⊆ B be a multi-set of atomic bids over a set G of types of goods. We say that B′ is a
feasible outcome for A= 〈G,B,Uin,Uout〉 if there is a sequence σ = 〈I1,O1〉, . . . , 〈Ik,Ok〉 of transformations such that:
(1) {〈I1, O 1〉, . . . , 〈Ik,Ok〉} ⊇⋃〈B,p,full〉∈B′ B;
(2) {〈I1, O 1〉, . . . , 〈Ik,Ok〉} \⋃〈B,p,full〉∈B′ B ⊆⋃〈B,p,partial〉∈B′ B;
(3) Mi−1 ⊇ Ii , for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, where M0 = Uin and Mi : G → N denote the quantities owned after the i-th trans-
formation, i.e., Mi =Mi−1 ∪Oi \ Ii .
Under the free disposal assumption, a solution to A is any feasible outcome B′ such that Mk ⊇ Uout . In the case of lack of
free disposal, instead, a solution to A is any feasible outcome such that Mk = Uout . 
The revenue of the auctioneer with a feasible outcome B′ is the sum of the payments associated with each atomic bid
in it, i.e., the value
∑
〈B,p,type〉∈B′ p.
An optimal solution is a solution providing the auctioneer with the maximum revenue over all the possible solutions.
Example 2.2. Consider again the supply chain presented in Example 1.1. The supply chain can be formalized as an instance
A¯= 〈G¯, B¯, U¯in, U¯out〉 where G¯ = {frame, brakes, drive train, front wheel, back wheel, seat, handlebars, chain, chainrings, dynamo,
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{chain, chainrings, frame, brakes}, and U¯out = {bicycle}. Notice in particular that prices are negative, for they express costs to
be payed by the auctioneer.
Under free disposal, the sets B¯′ = {〈{t1},−2, full〉, 〈{t3},−10, full〉, 〈{t5},−8, full〉, 〈{t6},−10, full〉} and B¯′′ =
{〈{t1},−2, full〉, 〈{t4},−17, full〉, 〈{t6},−10, full〉} are solutions whose associated revenues are −30 and −29, respec-
tively. In fact, B¯′′ is an optimal solution. Instead, under lack of free disposal, B¯′ is an optimal solution while B¯′′ is not
a solution at all. Indeed, by the transformation t4, the auctioneer obtains a dynamo, for which she might have to pay an
additional storage/disposal cost.
Note that each bid in B¯ consists of exactly one transformation. For a slightly more complex scenario involving combina-
torial bids, assume that a novel bidder takes part in the transformation process by offering the whole set {t1, t4, t6} for $11,
thereby giving rise to the instance 〈G¯, B¯∪ {〈{t1, t4, t6},−11, full〉}, U¯in, U¯out〉. Under the free disposal assumption, an opti-
mal solution to the novel instance is the set {〈{t1, t4, t6},−11, full〉}. Of course, the modiﬁcation does not alter the optimal
solutions under lack of free disposal, given that the novel bid is of type full and, thus, accepting it causes implementing t4.
Note that, if we consider the auction 〈G¯, B¯ ∪ {〈{t1, t4, t6},−11,partial〉}, U¯in, U¯out〉, then {〈{t1, t4, t6},−11,partial〉}
is an optimal outcome under the free disposal assumption. In absence of free disposal, the optimal outcome is
{〈{t1, t4, t6},−11,partial〉, 〈{t3},−10, full〉, 〈{t5},−8, full〉}, which is witnessed by the sequence t1, t3, t5, t6. 
Note that, in some cases, bidders need to communicate more complex bids to the auctioneer, rather than just atomic bids.
This calls for adopting an appropriate bidding language. In this paper, we consider the languages based on OR-combinations
and XOR-combinations of atomic bids, as deﬁned next (on top of instances over atomic bids). In fact, these languages
are natural adaptations in the context of MMUCAs from those languages that are used for combinatorial auctions (see,
e.g., [8]). In particular, the OR-language used to be the standard language for combinatorial auctions (see, e.g., [9]), while
XOR-combinations of bids have been introduced by [10] in order to obtain a full expressive language, where bidders can
report general preferences (both complementarity and substitutability).
Let G be a set of types of goods. A c-bid (with c ∈ {OR,XOR}) over G is an expression of the form L= b1 c b2 c · · · c bk ,
where bi is an atomic bid, for each 1 i  k. The multi-set {b1, . . . ,bk} of atomic bids is denoted by bids(L).
Let {L1, . . . ,Ln} be a multi-set of OR-bids (resp., XOR-bids), and let B′ be a multi-set of atomic bids. We say that B′
satisﬁes {L1, . . . ,Ln} if B′ ⊆⋃n=1 bids(L) (resp., B′ ⊆ {b′1, . . . ,b′n}, where b′ ∈ bids(L), for each 1    n). Thus, with
OR-bids (resp., XOR-bids), bidders submit sets of atomic bids and accept to implement any combination of them (resp., at
most one of them).
A MMUCA instance over c-bids is a tuple AC = 〈G, {L1, . . . ,Ln},Uin,Uout〉, where {L1, . . . ,Ln} is a multi-set of c-bids.
A multi-set B′ of atomic bids is a feasible outcome for AC if B′ satisﬁes {L1, . . . ,Ln} and is a feasible outcome for the
instance 〈G,⋃n=1 bids(L),Uin,Uout〉 over atomic bids. The notions of solution and optimal solution are then deﬁned anal-
ogously to the case of instances over atomic bids.
Example 2.3. In the supply chain discussed in Example 1.1, assume that a bidder communicates that she can implement
either the transformation t1 for $2 or, alternatively, the transformation t6 for $10. This can be formalized via the XOR-bid:
L¯1 =
〈{t1},−2, full〉 XOR 〈{t6},−10, full〉.
Moreover, consider the XOR-bids L¯2, . . . , L¯5 where L¯i = 〈{ti}, pi, full〉 and where pi is the price of the transformation ti ,
for each 2 i  5.
These bids give rise to an instance A¯XOR = 〈G¯, {L¯1, . . . , L¯5}, U¯in, U¯out〉 over XOR-bids, where we cannot execute both t1
and t6. Given that in order to produce a bicycle, t6 is mandatory, the constraint implies that the bid over {t1} cannot be
accepted. Thus, an optimal solution, under free disposal, has revenue −30 and is witnessed by the sequence t2, t4, t6. Note
that nothing changes w.r.t. the case discussed in Example 2.2, if OR-bids were submitted in place of the above XOR-bids.
Indeed, given the OR-bid 〈{t1},−2, full〉 OR 〈{t6},−10, full〉, it is feasible to accept both its atomic bids. 
We leave the section by noticing that any MMUCA instance over atomic bids can be viewed as a trivial instance over
OR-bids (resp., XOR-bids), where each OR-bid (resp., XOR-bid) actually consists of one atomic bid only.
2.2. Related work
Cerquides et al. [1] introduced Mixed Multi-Unit Combinatorial Auctions (MMUCAs) as an extension of classical com-
binatorial auctions. They discussed bidding languages, deﬁned the Winner-Determination problem, and pointed out its
NP-hardness. Moreover, they provided an algorithmic solution to Winner-Determination, which is based on an integer pro-
gram (IP) encoding. The solution approach uses binary decision variables for representing the set of transformations that
have to be accepted and the order in which they have to be implemented. As a drawback, it exploits a number of variables
that is quadratic in the overall number of transformations. Indeed, this formulation has been empirically proved to be use-
ful for solving only small and medium-sized instances [11]. Much of the subsequent research on MMUCAs has been in fact
devoted to develop novel solution methods that are able to overcome the limits of this approach.
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ables, instead of binary ones, and on some techniques for indexing them. This formulation requires a number of variables
that is linear in the number of transformations; however, the constraints needed to refer to the index of a variable by means
of another variable are relatively expensive. The second formulation is based on the division of the Winner-Determination
problem in two subproblems, that (i) determine the multi-set of transformations to accept and (ii) check if this multi-set
of transformations is implementable. These two subproblems can be solved by two independent integer programs. The ﬁrst
program looks for multi-sets of transformations that respect the bid constraints, allow to obtain a superset of the desired
goods, and maximize the revenue for the auctioneer. The second program looks for a valid sequence of transformations
where each transformation in the multi-set returned by the ﬁrst program is used exactly once. As a matter of fact, the
second program might not have a solution for the multi-set of transformations returned as a solution by the ﬁrst program.
Thus, it is sometimes necessary to repeatedly solve the ﬁrst subproblem, each time eliminating the solution obtained in the
previous iteration by adding a constraint.
Improvements in eﬃciency have been obtained by modifying the original formulation in [1], by adding constraints de-
voted to code transformation dependencies [3]. In a nutshell, the key observation is that if a transformation requires in input
some goods that can be produced only after that another transformation has been executed, then a partial order among
these two transformations can be established. Partial orders are subsequently exploited to build a solution template and the
search space is pruned by enforcing MMUCA solutions to fulﬁll such template. By using this novel formulation, an empirical
study about the factors (in terms of some topological, problem size, and price-based features) that make MMUCA instances
hard to solve has been performed [12].
In a complementary line of research, the formalism of Petri Nets has been adopted in order to obtain more eﬃcient
solvers for the Winner-Determination problem [13,14]. In particular, an extension of classical Petri Nets, called Weighted
Transition Petri Nets (WTPN), has been introduced to encompass the costs associated to transformations, and a new type of
reachability problem over them (called MAXSEQ) has been deﬁned. A mapping between MMUCA and WTPN instances has
been discussed as well as the correspondence between the Winner-Determination problem for MMUCAs and the MAXSEQ
problem for the associated WTPN. By means of this approach, the number of decision variables has been reduced from
quadratic to linear for all classes of MMUCA instances that can be represented by acyclic WTPNs.
Note that all the methods discussed above have been empirically validated on artiﬁcial datasets. Indeed, building gener-
ators of syntectic data that are representative of real scenarios is an active area of research [15,11,4,16]. In particular, the
MMUCATS tool [16], a test suite for MMUCAs, allows to integrate new Winner-Determination algorithms, to evaluate, and
to compare them.
Finally, an extension of the MMUCA framework that takes into account some types of time constraints has been recently
proposed [19]. This extension supports the speciﬁcation of partial orderings among the transformations, by relating trans-
formations to absolute time points, and by constraining transformation durations. The Winner-Determination problem for
this new type of MMUCAs has been deﬁned, and the original IP formulation [1] of the Winner-Determination problem has
been extended for supporting time constraints. The number of variables in such extended IP formulation remains quadratic
in the number of transformations.
3. FEASIBILITY and qualitative restrictions
The Feasibility problem for MMUCAs consists in deciding whether a mixed multi-unit combinatorial auction instance
AC = 〈G, {L1, . . . ,Ln},Uin,Uout〉 over c-bids (with c ∈ {OR,XOR}) provided as input admits solutions. Note that the problem
of deciding the existence of a solution is immaterial for classical combinatorial auctions under the free disposal assumption.
Instead, it emerged to be computationally intractable for combinatorial auctions under the lack of free disposal assump-
tion [17]. Moreover, we point out that the problem has been studied for reverse auctions, where the auctioneer is trying to
buy a certain set of goods, and for combinatorial exchanges, which is a generalization of auctions and reverse auctions where
participants are allowed to both buy and sell items. In these two latter settings, the problem emerged to be intractable with
XOR-bids even under the free disposal assumption [17,18].
In fact, similarly to the case of reverse auctions and combinatorial exchanges, Feasibility makes sense in our context
where the auctioneer wants to end up with some desired goods, even under the free disposal assumption. For instance, it
is easily seen that there would be no solution in Example 2.3, if the bid L¯1 was not submitted to the auctioneer. A crucial
problem for MMUCAs is therefore to characterize the computational complexity of Feasibility and, in particular, to sin-
gle out classes of instances over which computing optimal solutions is feasible in polynomial time. In the following, we
shall precisely address this study, by charting the tractability frontier of Feasibility with respect to various “qualitative”
properties of the underlying instances. To this end, consider the instance AC = 〈G, {L1, . . . ,Ln},Uin,Uout〉, and let Tr de-
note the multi-set of all transformations occurring in its bids. Then, let us deﬁne the following parameters, where for each
good g , the auctioneer making available or requiring g is counted as one virtual transformation producing or consuming it,
respectively:
in-var(AC) = max{max〈I,O〉∈Tr |{g ∈ G | I(g) > 0}|,min{1,
∑
g∈G Uout(g)}} is the input variety of AC, i.e., the maximum
number of types of goods required as input by any given transformation over all possible transformations.
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∑
g∈G Uin(g)}} is the output variety of AC, i.e., the maximum
number of types of goods produced by any given transformation over all possible transformations.
in-mul(AC) = maxg∈G {max〈I,O〉∈Tr I(g),Uout(g)} is the input multiplicity of AC, i.e., the maximum quantity of any good
required as input by any given transformation over all possible transformations.
out-mul(AC) = maxg∈G{max〈I,O〉∈Tr O(g),Uin(g)} is the output multiplicity of AC, i.e., the maximum quantity of any good
produced by any given transformation over all possible transformations.
in-deg(AC) = maxg∈G(|{〈I,O〉 ∈ Tr |O(g) > 0}| +min{1,Uin(g)}) is the input degree of AC, i.e., the maximum number of
transformations producing any given good over all possible goods.
out-deg(AC) = maxg∈G(|{〈I,O〉 ∈ Tr | I(g) > 0}| + min{1,Uout(g)}) is the output degree of AC, i.e., the maximum number
of transformations requiring any given good over all possible goods.
Note that all the above parameters depend on the transformations Tr occurring in the auction, but not on the speciﬁc
bids deﬁned over them.
Example 3.1. Consider the MMUCA instance A¯XOR deﬁned in Example 2.3 and involving the set {t1, . . . , t6} of transforma-
tions, which are graphically depicted in Fig. 1. By inspecting the ﬁgure, we can see that in-var(A¯XOR) = 7 (because of t6),
out-var(A¯XOR) = 5 (because of t4), in-mul(A¯XOR) = out-mul(A¯XOR) = 1 (since all transformations require and produce just
one item of each type of good, and since one item at most of each type of good is initially available or ﬁnally requested
by the auctioneer), in-deg(A¯XOR) = 2 (because, e.g., of seat that is produced by t3 and t4), and out-deg(A¯XOR) = 2 (because,
e.g., of chain that is required by t1 and t2). 
In the following, the notation CC(iv,ov,im,om,id,od) will be used to indicate the class of all instances AC such that:
in-var(AC)  iv, out-var(AC)  ov, in-mul(AC)  im, out-mul(AC)  om, in-deg(AC)  id, and out-deg(AC)  od. When
focusing on instances with atomic bids only, the subscript ‘C’ will be omitted. Moreover, we shall use the symbol ∞ to
denote that no bound is issued on some given parameter.
Summary of results. A detailed analysis of the computational complexity arising with the Feasibility problem over sev-
eral classes CC(iv,ov,im,om,id,od) of instances is reported in the rest of this section. In particular, the complexity of
Feasibility is analyzed by considering two different scenarios:
1. First, we analyze the case where each atomic bid 〈B, p, type〉 involved in the deﬁnition of the MMUCA instance is such
that |B| = 1, i.e., such that all atomic bids are deﬁned over singleton sets of transformations. This is, for instance, the
case of Example 2.2. In fact, this scenario is peculiar for MMUCAs and its analysis is therefore crucial to single out the
source of intractability that can be hidden in the interactions occurring in production processes.
2. Then, we consider the general case where no restriction is imposed over the bids involved in the instance. Note that
this scenario is essentially equivalent to the one in (1), whenever all bids are of type = partial. Indeed, as far as the
Feasibility problem is concerned, any atomic bid 〈B, p, type〉 with type = partial and where |B| = k can be transpar-
ently substituted with k fresh atomic bids (whose associated payments are irrelevant), each one being deﬁned over a
different transformation taken from B. Therefore, we shall only focus to the case where there is at least one bid of
type= full.
A summary of the complexity results for the case where bids are deﬁned over singleton sets of transformations is
reported in Fig. 2. Note that the expressiveness of XOR-bids [1] is payed in terms of smaller tractability islands. Moreover,
note that the complexity of OR-bids and atomic bids coincides, with hardness results being actually given over auctions that
use atomic bids only. Finally, note that the lack of free disposal represents an additional source of intractability.
A summary of the complexity results arising with bids deﬁned over arbitrary sets of transformations (and with at least
one bid with type= full) is reported in Fig. 3. Of course, all hardness results provided for singleton sets of transformations
still hold in this more general setting. In fact, most of the results in Fig. 2 have been strengthened, thus showing that
introducing the possibility of deﬁning bids over arbitrary sets of transformations makes problems substantially harder than
before.
The rest of the section is devoted to provide detailed proofs of such complexity results. Actually, membership in NP
has been show in [1] for arbitrary MMUCA instances. Thus, we shall either just provide NP-hardness results, or single out
islands of tractability.
3.1. Hard instances for atomic bids over singleton sets of transformations
Let us start by considering MMUCA instances over atomic bids, and by providing hardness results that still hold when
bids are deﬁned over singleton sets of transformations. In this scenario, since we are interested in the Feasibility prob-
lem, we can get rid, w.l.o.g., of the type of the bids and of their associated payments. Thus, any bid can be equivalently
viewed as a transformation, and a MMUCA instance A can be deﬁned as a tuple 〈G,T ,Uin,Uout〉, where T is a multi-set
of transformations. A solution is then a sequence of transformations taken from T and satisfying condition (3) in Deﬁni-
tion 2.1.
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iv ov im om id od Free disposal
1 1 1 1 ∞ ∞ in P [Thm. 3.13]
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 in P [Thm. 3.14]
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 ∞ in P [Thm. 3.15]
2 1 1 1 2 2 NP-complete [Thm. 3.5]
1 2 1 1 2 2 NP-complete [Thm. 3.3]
1 1 2 1 2 2 NP-complete [Thm. 3.6]
1 1 1 2 2 2 NP-complete [Thm. 3.4]
XOR-bids
iv ov im om id od Free disposal
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 ∞ in P [Thm. 3.16]
1 1 1 1 2 1 NP-complete [Thm. 3.11]
OR-bids ≡ atomic bids
iv ov im om id od Lack of free disposal
1 1 1 1 ∞ ∞ in P [Thm. 3.13]
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 in P [Thm. 3.14]
1 1 ∞ ∞ 1 ∞ NP-complete [Thm. 3.10]
2 1 1 1 1 2 NP-complete [Thm.3.9]
1 2 1 1 2 2 NP-complete [Thm.3.8]
1 1 2 1 2 2 NP-complete [Thm.3.8]
1 1 1 2 2 2 NP-complete [Thm.3.8]
XOR-bids
iv ov im om id od Lack of free disposal
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 1 in P [Thm. 3.17]
1 1 ∞ ∞ 1 ∞ NP-complete [Thm. 3.12]
1 1 1 1 2 1 NP-complete [Thm. 3.12]
2 1 1 1 1 2 NP-complete [Thm. 3.12]
Fig. 2. Feasibility and qualitative restrictions. Summary of results for bids over singleton sets of transformations.
We start by analyzing the case when the free disposal assumption holds. Hardness results for this setting are next
provided via reductions from the problem of checking the Satisﬁability of Boolean formulas in conjunctive normal form.
Recall that deciding whether a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal form Φ = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cm over the variables X1, . . . , Xn
is satisﬁable, i.e., deciding whether there exists a truth assignment to the variables making each clause c j true, is NP-
hard [20]. In fact, to simplify the following reductions, we ﬁnd it useful to state the intractability of a speciﬁc class of
Boolean formulas, whose proof is reported in Appendix A.
Lemma 3.2. Satisﬁability is NP-hard, even on classes of Boolean formulas in conjunctive normal form where each variable occurs
positively in two clauses and negatively in another, and where each clause contains three literals at most.
Theorem 3.3. Feasibility is NP-hard under the free disposal assumption, even when restricted to the class C(1,2,1,1,2,2).
Proof. Let Φ = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cm be a Boolean formula over the variables X1, . . . , Xn satisfying the conditions in Lemma 3.2, and
let A(Φ) = 〈G,T ,Uin,Uout〉 be the MMUCA instance over atomic bids (deﬁned over singleton sets of transformations) such
that: G =⋃ni=1{Xi, XTi , X Fi } ∪ {c1, . . . , cm} ∪ {cij | Xi occurs in c j}, Uin = {X1, . . . , Xn}, Uout = {c1, . . . , cm}, and T =⋃ni=1 Ti .
In particular, for each variable Xi occurring positively in the clauses cα and cβ while occurring negatively in cγ , the set Ti
consists of the set of transformations {〈{Xi}, {XTi }〉, 〈{Xi}, {X Fi }〉, 〈{XTi }, {ciα, ciβ}〉, 〈{X Fi }, {ciγ }〉, 〈{ciα}, {cα}〉, 〈{ciβ}, {cβ}〉, and
〈{ciγ }, {cγ }〉}. An illustration of Ti is reported in Fig. 4.
Observe that two transformations occur in Ti requiring Xi as input, one that produces XTi and another that produces X Fi .
These transformations are meant to encode the selection of a truth value assignment to the variable Xi and, in fact, they
are mutually exclusive in any solution, since there is just one copy of Xi in Uin .
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iv ov im om id od Free disposal
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 in P [Thm. 3.20]
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 ∞ in P [Thm. 3.19]
1 1 1 1 2 2 NP-complete [Thm. 3.18]
XOR-bids
iv ov im om id od Free disposal
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 ∞ in P [Thm. 3.19]
1 1 1 1 2 1 NP-complete [Thm. 3.11]
OR-bids ≡ atomic bids
iv ov im om id od Lack of free disposal
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 in P [Thm. 3.20]
1 1 1 1 1 2 NP-complete [Thm. 3.18]
XOR-bids
iv ov im om id od Lack of free disposal
∞ ∞ ∞ ∞ 1 1 in P [Thm. 3.21]
1 1 1 1 2 1 NP-complete [Thm. 3.12]
1 1 1 1 1 2 NP-complete [Thm. 3.18]
Fig. 3. Feasibility and qualitative restrictions. Summary of results for bids over arbitrary (i.e., not necessarily singleton) sets of transformations.
Fig. 4. Hardness results over atomic bids: Reductions in the proofs of Theorems 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6.
Based on the above observation, we now claim: Φ is satisﬁable ⇔A(Φ) has a solution.
(⇒) Let x be a satisfying assignment of Φ , and consider the sequences of transformations σi , for each 1 i  n, such that
σi = 〈{Xi}, {XTi }〉, 〈{XTi }, {ciα, ciβ}〉, 〈{ciα}, {cα}〉, 〈{ciβ}, {cβ}〉 if Xi evaluates true in x, and such that σi = 〈{Xi}, {X Fi }〉,
〈{X Fi }, {ciγ }〉, 〈{ciγ }, {cγ }〉 if Xi evaluates false. By construction, the sequence σ1, . . . , σn obtained as their concatenation
satisﬁes condition (3) in Deﬁnition 2.1 and leads to the desired ﬁnal conﬁguration. Thus, σ1, . . . , σn is a solution to
A(Φ).
(⇐) Let σ be a solution to A(Φ). Then, for each clause c j , with 1 j m, σ executed a set of transformations producing
as an intermediate good either XT or X F , for some variable Xi occurring in c j : Let x be the (possibly partial) truthi i
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F
i ) is the produced good. It is
immediate to check that x is a satisfying assignment of Φ .
To conclude the proof, observe that A(Φ) belongs to C(1,2,1,1,3,2), but not necessarily to C(1,2,1,1,2,2) since
a clause c j may contain three variables Xi, Xi′ , and Xi′′ . In order to face this case, we can add one further good c¯ j , and
replace the two transformations 〈{ci′j }, {c j}〉 and 〈{ci′′j }, {c j}〉 with the transformations: 〈{ci
′
j }, {c¯ j}〉, 〈{ci
′′
j }, {c¯ j}〉, and 〈{c¯ j}, {c j}〉.
Clearly, the resulting auction has input degree equals to 2, while keeping unchanged the values of all the other parameters
and the properties of the reduction. 
The following three results are based on simple adaptations of the reduction in Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.4. Feasibility is NP-hard under the free disposal assumption, even when restricted to the class C(1,1,1,2,2,2).
Proof. Let Φ = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cm be a Boolean formula over the variables X1, . . . , Xn satisfying the conditions in Lemma 3.2.
Let A1(Φ) be the auction that is obtained from A(Φ) (deﬁned in the proof of Theorem 3.3) by substituting the two trans-
formations 〈{Xi}, {XTi }〉 and 〈{XTi }, {ciα, ciβ}〉, with the transformations 〈{Xi}, {XTi , XTi }〉, 〈{XTi }, {ciα}〉, 〈{XTi }, {ciβ}〉, for each
1 i  n. Thus, Xi can generate two copies of XTi , each one enabling one of the two clauses where Xi positively occurs. See
Fig. 4 for an illustration. Eventually, each of the two transformations 〈{Xi}, {XTi , XTi }〉 and the transformation 〈{Xi}, {X Fi }〉 are
still mutually exclusive in any sequence of transformations satisfying condition (3) in Deﬁnition 2.1. Thus, the line of rea-
soning in the proof of Theorem 3.3 still applies (in particular, note that the case where in-deg(A1(Φ)) = 3 can be reduced
to a case where in-deg(A1(Φ)) = 2), and we can conclude that Φ is satisﬁable ⇔ A1(Φ) has a solution. 
Theorem 3.5. Feasibility is NP-hard under the free disposal assumption, even when restricted to the class C(2,1,1,1,2,2).
Proof. Let Φ = c1 ∧· · ·∧ cm be a Boolean formula over the variables X1, . . . , Xn satisfying the conditions in Lemma 3.2. Con-
sider the auction A2(Φ) = 〈G,T ,Uin,Uout〉 such that: G =⋃ni=1{Xi, X ′i, XTi , Xi, X ′i, X Fi } ∪ {c1, . . . , cm} ∪ {cij | Xi occurs in c j},
Uin = {X1, . . . , Xn, X ′1, . . . , X ′n}, Uout = {c1, . . . , cm}, and T =
⋃n
i=1 Ti . In particular, for each variable Xi occurring positively
in the clauses cα and cβ while occurring negatively in cγ , Ti is the set {〈{Xi}, {XTi }〉, 〈{Xi}, {Xi}〉, 〈{X ′i}, {XTi }〉, 〈{X ′i}, {X ′i}〉,
〈{Xi, X ′i}, {X Fi }〉, 〈{XTi }, {ciα}〉, 〈{XTi }, {ciβ}〉, 〈{X Fi }, {ciγ }〉, 〈{ciα}, {cα}〉, 〈{ciβ}, {cβ}〉, 〈{ciγ }, {cγ }〉}. An illustration of Ti is reported
in Fig. 4.
Observe that for each variable Xi , the transformation 〈{Xi}, {XTi }〉 is mutually exclusive with 〈{Xi}, {Xi}〉, and that
〈{X ′i}, {XTi }〉 is mutually exclusive with 〈{X ′i}, {X ′i}〉. Thus, the application of a transformation in {〈{Xi}, {XTi }〉, 〈{X ′i}, {XTi }〉}
is mutually exclusive with the application of 〈{Xi, X ′i}, {X Fi }〉, thereby encoding a selection of a truth value assignment
to the variable Xi . Thus, the line of reasoning in the proof of Theorem 3.4 still applies (in particular, note that the case
where in-deg(A2(Φ)) = 3 can be reduced to a case where in-deg(A2(Φ)) = 2), so that it possible to produce a superset
of {c1, . . . , cm} if, and only if, all the various selected transformations encode a satisfying assignment of Φ . That is, Φ is
satisﬁable ⇔ A2(Φ) has a solution. 
Theorem 3.6. Feasibility is NP-hard under the free disposal assumption, even when restricted to the class C(1,1,2,1,2,2).
Proof. Let Φ = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cm be a Boolean formula over the variables X1, . . . , Xn satisfying the conditions in Lemma 3.2.
Let A3(Φ) be the auction obtained from A2(Φ) (deﬁned in the proof of Theorem 3.5) by substituting the transfor-
mations 〈{Xi}, {Xi}〉, 〈{X ′i}, {X ′i}〉, 〈{Xi, X ′i}, {X Fi }〉 and 〈{X Fi }, {ciγ }〉, with the transformations 〈{Xi}, {X Fi }〉, 〈{X ′i}, {X Fi }〉 and
〈{X Fi , X Fi }, {ciγ }〉, for each 1 i  n. Basically, Xi and X ′i may now generate two copies of X Fi , together enabling the clause
where Xi negatively occurs. See Fig. 4 for an illustration. In fact, the transformation 〈〈{X Fi , X Fi }, {ciγ }〉〉 can be applied if, and
only if, none of the transformations in {〈{XTi }, {ciα}〉, 〈{XTi }, {ciβ}〉} is applied. Thus, the line of reasoning in the proof of The-
orem 3.3 can still be used (again, the case where in-deg(A3(Φ)) = 3 can be reduced to a case where in-deg(A3(Φ)) = 2),
and we have that Φ is satisﬁable ⇔ A3(Φ) has a solution. 
In order to complete the picture, we need now to consider the problem under the lack of free disposal assumption.
In fact, in the proofs of Theorems 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, the careful reader may have noticed that if the formula Φ
is satisﬁable, then there might be solutions to the MMUCA instance (built based on Φ) producing more than one copy
of some output good. Indeed, this happens if the same clause is satisﬁed by two different variables in a satisfying truth
assignment. To avoid these cases and smoothly apply the above proofs under the lack of free disposal assumption, we shall
use a reduction from the problem of deciding whether, given a Boolean formula Φ , there is a satisfying assignment such
that, for each clause, exactly one literal evaluates true. The problem, which we call exact-1 Satisﬁability, remains NP-hard
even if each clause exactly contains three literals (problem ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT in [21]). Below we state the hardness of a
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Lemma 3.2.
Lemma 3.7. exact-1 Satisﬁability is NP-hard, even on classes of Boolean formulas in conjunctive normal form where each variable
occurs positively in two clauses and negatively in another, and where each clause contains three literals at most.
In the light of the above lemma, by inspecting the proofs of Theorems 3.3, 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6, we obtain that, given
a formula Φ , there is a satisfying assignment such that, for each clause, exactly one literal evaluates true (i.e., exact-1
Satisﬁability has a solution over Φ) if, and only if, the corresponding MMUCA has a solution under the lack of free
disposal. Thus, the following can be straightforwardly derived.
Theorem 3.8. Feasibility is NP-hard under the lack of free disposal assumption, even when restricted to the classes C(2,1,1,1,2,2),
C(1,2,1,1,2,2), C(1,1,2,1,2,2), and C(1,1,1,2,2,2).
In fact, Theorem 3.8 can be further strengthened in the two directions which are next analyzed.
Theorem 3.9. Feasibility is NP-hard under the lack of free disposal assumption, even when restricted to the class C(2,1,1,1,1,2).
Proof. The reduction is again from the exact-1 Satisﬁability problem. We recall ﬁrst that exact-1 Satisﬁability is known
to be NP-hard even on classes of Boolean formulas in conjunctive normal form where not only each clause contains exactly
three literals (problem ONE-IN-THREE 3SAT in [21]), but also if all variables occur positively in the formula [21]. Let Φ =
c1 ∧· · ·∧ cm be a Boolean formula over the variables X1, . . . , Xn satisfying the conditions stated above. Consider the MMUCA
instance A4(Φ) = 〈G,T ,Uin,∅〉 such that: G = {X1, . . . , Xn}∪⋃ni=1{cij | Xi occurs in c j} ∪{c1, . . . , cm}, Uin = {c1, . . . , cm}, and
T =⋃ni=1 Ti ∪⋃mj=1 T ′j . In particular, for each variable Xi , Ti is the set {〈{cij | Xi occurs in c j}, {Xi}〉, 〈{Xi},∅〉}. And, for each
clause c j , T ′j is the set {〈{c j}, {cij}〉 | Xi occurs in c j}}.
Note that the transformations in T ′j are meant to encode the selection of a variable satisfying the clause and they are
mutually exclusive with each other, since there is just one copy of c j in A4(Φ). On the other hand, the transformations in
Ti imply that Xi can be derived if, and only if, cij is derived for each clause c j where Xi occurs. In fact, whenever Xi is
produced, it can be consumed by the transformation 〈{Xi},∅〉.
Based on these observations, we now claim that exact-1 Satisﬁability has a solution over Φ ⇔A4(Φ) has a solution under
the lack of free disposal assumption.
(⇒) Let x be a satisfying assignment of Φ such that, for each clause, exactly one variable evaluates true. In particular,
for a clause c j , let x( j) denote the index of the variable in c j that evaluates true in x. Consider now the set of
transformations S j = {〈{c j}, {cx( j)j }〉, 〈{cx( j)j′ | Xx( j) occurs in c j′ }, {Xx( j)}〉, 〈{Xx( j)},∅〉}. Note that if c j and c j′ are two
clauses containing a variable Xi evaluating true in x, then it must be the case that i = x( j) = x( j′). It follows that we
can order the transformations in the set
⋃m
j=1 S j in a way satisfying condition (3) in Deﬁnition 2.1. Note that after the
application of such a sequence of transformations, no good remains to the auctioneer.
(⇐) Let σ be a solution to A4(Φ). In order to consume all goods initially owned due to the lack of free disposal, σ must in-
clude (as a postﬁx) a number of transformations of the form 〈{Xi},∅〉. Moreover, for each transformation consuming Xi ,
we have in turn that σ includes the transformation 〈{cij | Xi occurs c j}, {Xi}〉. It follows that the truth assignment x
where each variable Xi evaluates true if, and only if, Xi is an intermediate good produced by σ is a satisfying as-
signment of Φ . Moreover, as transformations in T ′j are mutually exclusive, x is such that, for each clause, exactly one
literal evaluates true.
To conclude the proof, observe that A4(Φ) belongs to C(3,1,1,1,1,k), since a clause c j contain three variables (and,
thus, out-deg(A4(Φ)) = 3), and since the same variable can occur in k clauses (and, thus, in-var(A4(Φ)) = k).
For the former case, let c j be a clause containing the variables Xi, Xi′ , and Xi′′ . Then, we can add one fresh good c¯ j ,
and replace the transformations in T ′j with 〈{c j}, {cij}〉, 〈{c j}, {c¯ j}〉, 〈{c¯ j}, {ci
′
j }〉, 〈{c¯ j}, {ci
′′
j }〉. The output degree in the trans-
formed auction is 2. Instead, for the latter case, if a variable Xi occurs in the clauses c j1 , . . . , c jk , then we can add the
fresh goods X1i , . . . , X
k
i and substitute the transformations in Ti with 〈{cij1 }, {X1i }〉, 〈{X1i , cij2 }, {X2i }〉, . . . , 〈{Xk−1i , cijk }, {Xki }〉,
〈{Xki }, {Xi}〉, 〈{Xi},∅〉. The input degree is 2. All the other properties of the reduction remain unchanged. 
Theorem 3.10. Feasibility is NP-hard under the lack of free disposal assumption, even when restricted to the class C(1,1,∞,∞,
1,∞).
Proof. Deciding whether there is a way to partition a bag S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} of integers into two bags S1 and S2 such that
the sum of the numbers in S1 equals the sum of the numbers in S2 is the NP-complete Partition problem [21].
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i=1{〈
⋃si
i=1{α}, {}〉}. Note that there is no bound on the output multiplicity of A(S), since Uin(α) =m/2.
It is immediate to check that, under the lack of free disposal, there is a solution to A(S) if, and only if, Partition has
a solution on input S . Indeed, solutions to A(S) one-to-one correspond with sets of transformations consuming exactly all
the input goods, and thus such that the sum of their associated input requirements equals to m/2. 
For the sake of completeness, note that the reduction in the above proof is from the Partition problem, which is feasible
in polynomial time if all integers are assumed to be given in unary (formally, the problem is weakly NP-hard). Assessing
whether a strong NP-hardness result can be achieved is an interesting technical question.
3.2. Hard instances for XOR-bids over singleton sets of transformations
Let us now move to analyze the case of XOR-bids, by providing hardness results that still hold under the simple scenario
where all the bids are deﬁned over singleton sets of transformations. W.l.o.g. (given our interest in the Feasibility problem
and given the focus on singleton sets of transformations), in the following, we shall simply view any XOR-bid L as an
expression t1 XOR t2 XOR . . . XOR tk , where ti is a transformation (rather than an atomic bid), for each 1 i  k.
We start with the case of free disposal.
Theorem 3.11. Feasibility is NP-hard under the free disposal assumption, even when restricted to the class CXOR(1,1,1,1,2,1).
Proof. Let Φ = c1 ∧· · ·∧ cm be a Boolean formula over the variables X1, . . . , Xn satisfying the conditions in Lemma 3.2. Con-
sider the MMUCA instance over XOR-bids A5(Φ) = 〈G, {La1, . . . ,Lan | a ∈ {1, . . . ,4}},Uin,Uout〉 such that: G = {c1, . . . , cm} ∪
{cij | Xi occurs in c j}, Uin = {}, Uout = {c1, . . . , cm}, and where {La1, . . . ,Lan | a ∈ {1, . . . ,4}} is a set of XOR-bids deﬁned
as follows. For each variable Xi that occurs positively in cα and cβ while occurring negatively in cγ , let us deﬁne
L1i = 〈{}, {ciα}〉 XOR 〈{}, {ciγ }〉, L2i = 〈{ciγ }, {cγ }〉 XOR 〈{}, {ciβ}〉, L3i = 〈{ciα}, {cα}〉, and L4i = 〈{ciβ}, {cβ}〉.
We now claim that Φ is satisﬁable ⇔A(Φ) has a solution.
(⇒) Let x be a satisfying assignment of Φ , and consider the sequences of transformations σi , for each 1 i  n, such that
σi = 〈{}, {ciα}〉, 〈{}, {ciβ}〉, 〈{ciα}, {cα}〉, 〈{ciβ}, {cβ}〉 if Xi evaluates true in x, and such that σi = 〈{}, {ciγ }〉, 〈{ciγ }, {cγ }〉 if
Xi evaluates false. By construction, the sequence σ1, . . . , σn obtained as their concatenation satisﬁes condition (3) in
Deﬁnition 2.1 and leads to the desired ﬁnal conﬁguration. Moreover, note that the set of all the bids in such sequence
satisﬁes {L1i ,L2i ,L3i ,L4i }, for each 1 i  n. Thus, σ1, . . . , σn is a solution to A5(Φ).
(⇐) Let σ be a solution to A5(Φ). Note that, for each variable Xi that occurs positively in cα and cβ while occur-
ring negatively in cγ , σ cannot execute the transformation 〈{ciγ }, {cγ }〉 together with any of the transformations in
{〈{ciα}, {cα}〉, 〈{ciβ}, {cβ}〉}. Thus, let x be the truth assignment where each variable Xi evaluates false if, and only if,
〈{ciγ }, {cγ }〉 is executed in σ . By construction, it is immediate to check that x is a satisfying assignment of Φ .
To conclude the proof, note that we may have in-deg(A5(Φ)) = 3 because of some clause containing three variables.
Normalization can be carried out along the line discussed in the proof of Theorem 3.3, in order to guarantee that the input
degree of the transformed instance is 2. 
Then, the picture is easily completed for the case of lack of free disposal.
Theorem 3.12. Feasibility is NP-hard under the lack of free disposal, even when restricted to the classes CXOR(1,1,1,1,2,1),
CXOR(2,1,1,1,1,2), and CXOR(1,1,∞,∞,1,∞).
Proof. The fact that Feasibility is NP-hard on the class CXOR(1,1,1,1,2,1) under the lack of free disposal follows by
inspection of the proof of Theorem 3.11 and by exploiting a reduction from the problem in Lemma 3.7—see the arguments
used in the previous section for Theorem 3.8. Hardness over the classes CXOR(2,1,1,1,1,2) and CXOR(1,1,∞,1,1,∞)
follows from Theorem 3.9 and Theorem 3.10, since CXOR(2,1,1,1,1,2) ⊃ C(2,1,1,1,1,2) and CXOR(1,1,∞,∞,1,∞) ⊃
C(1,1,∞,∞,1,∞), respectively. 
3.3. Tractable instances for OR-bids over singleton sets of transformations
Let us now focus on proving tractability results, by starting with the case of OR-bids deﬁned over singleton sets of
transformations. Before presenting this analysis, we note that if AOR = 〈G, {L1, . . . ,Ln},Uin,Uout〉 is a MMUCA instance
where {L1, . . . ,Ln} is a multi-set of OR-bids, then deciding the existence of a solution to AOR just reduces to deciding the
existence of a solution to the instance 〈G,⋃n=1 bids(L),Uin,Uout〉 over atomic bids. Indeed, the satisﬁability of OR-bids is
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Fig. 6. Example construction in the proof of Theorem 3.13, in the case of lack free disposal case.
actually immaterial. Thus, instances over OR-bids will be next equivalently viewed as instances over atomic bids. Moreover,
recall that, by assuming that each bid is deﬁned over singleton sets of transformations, we can get rid of the type of the
bids and of their associated payments. Thus, as in Section 3.1, we shall analyze a setting where a MMUCA instance A is
just deﬁned as a tuple 〈G,T ,Uin,Uout〉, where T is a multi-set of transformations, and where a solution is a sequence of
transformations taken from T and satisfying condition (3) in Deﬁnition 2.1.
We start by considering the case where every transformation requires and produces an item of one good at most. We
show that Feasibility is feasible in polynomial time both under the free disposal assumption and without free disposal.
Theorem 3.13. On the class COR(1,1,1,1,∞,∞) restricted to instances deﬁned over singleton sets of transformations, Feasibility
is in P.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst the case of free disposal. Let A= 〈G,T ,Uin,Uout〉 be a MMUCA such that A ∈ COR(1,1,1,1,∞,∞).
Based on A, we view the goods in G as nodes and we build a directed graph (N, E) such that N = G ∪ {s, t} and E =
{(g, g′) | {g, g′} ⊆ G ∧ g = g′} ∪ {(s, g), (g, t) | g ∈ G}, where s and t do not occur in G .
The idea is to associate with (N, E) the ﬂow network 〈(N, E),u, 〉,u : E →R0,  : E →R0, where each edge e ∈ E has
a capacity u(e) and a lower bound (e) that bound, respectively, the maximum and minimum quantity of ﬂow that can
cross it, and where the node s (resp., t) is the source (resp., the sink). Recall ﬁrst, e.g., from [22], that a ﬂow assignment
on 〈(N, E),u, 〉 is a function f : E → R0 satisfying the following constraints: (e) f (e) u(e), for each e ∈ E (capacity
constraints), and
∑
w∈N f (w, v)−
∑
r∈N f (v, r) = 0, for each v ∈ N \ {s, t} (conservation constraints). Moreover, recall that the
value of f is the number
∑
w∈N f (w, t). Then, we deﬁne edge capacities and lower bounds as follows:
• For each edge of the form (s, g), let u(s, g) = Uin(g) + |{〈∅,O〉 ∈ T |O(g) > 0}| and (s, g) = Uin(g). That is, the sink s
pushes in the network via the edge (s, g) at least Uin(g) units of ﬂow, plus at most |{〈∅,O〉 ∈ T |O(g) > 0}| additional
units associated with transformations producing g and requiring no goods as input.
• For each edge of the form (g, t), let u(g, t) = Uout(g) + M(g) and (g, t) = Uout(g). That is, the source t absorbs via
the edge (g, t) at least Uout(g) units of ﬂow, plus at most M(g) additional units. In particular, M(g) has to be set as
an upper bound on the maximum number of goods of type g being produced over all the possible solutions to A. For
instance, we can set M(g) =∑g∈G Uin(g) + |T |.
• For each edge of the form (g, g′), let u(g, g′) = |〈I,O〉 ∈ T | I(g) > 0∧O(g′) > 0| and (g, g′) = 0. That is, this edge is
prepared to route a number of units of ﬂow corresponding to the number of transformations receiving g as input and
producing g′ as output.
To exemplify the above construction, consider the very simple MMUCA instance A¯ = 〈G¯, T¯ , U¯in, U¯out〉 such that G¯ =
{g, g′}, T¯ = {〈{g}, {g′}〉, 〈{}, {g′}〉}, U¯in(g) = 1, U¯in(g′) = 0, U¯out(g) = 0, and U¯out(g′) = 1. The associated ﬂow network is
reported in Fig. 5, together with a graphical illustration of an admissible ﬂow having value 2 (where edges associated with
an empty ﬂow are omitted). Note that such admissible ﬂow corresponds to a solution to A¯, where the transformation
〈{}, {g′}〉 is used to produce a unit of g′ so that the auctioneer ends up with a unit of g′ plus the unit of g initially available
to her. Another admissible ﬂow, but having value 1, is reported in the right part of Fig. 6. There, the ﬂow corresponds to a
solution where the good g initially available to the auctioneer is transformed via 〈{g}, {g′}〉 into the good g′ , which is the
desired outcome. In fact, the above correspondences are not by chance.
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(⇒) Assume that σ is a solution to A, and let Tσ be the multi-set of all the transformations in σ . Then, con-
sider the function f : E → R0 deﬁned as follows. For each edge of the form (s, g), let fσ (s, g) = Uin(g) +
|{〈∅,O〉 ∈ Tσ | O(g) > 0}|. For each edge of the form (g, g′), let fσ (g, g′) = |〈I,O〉 ∈ Tσ | I(g) > 0 ∧ O(g′)
> 0|. And, for each edge of the form (g, t), let fσ (g, t) = fσ (s, g)+∑(g′,g)∈E∧g′∈G fσ (g, g′)−∑(g,g′)∈E∧g′∈G fσ (g, g′).
Note that, by construction, the function fσ satisﬁes the conservation constraints of the ﬂow network 〈(N, E),u, 〉, and
the capacity constraints for the edges of the form (s, g), (g, g′), and (g′, g) with g′ ∈ G . Consider then any edge of the
form (g, t) and observe that since σ is a solution, it must be the case that fσ (g, t) Uout(g). That is, fσ also satisﬁes
the capacity constraints for the edges of the form (g, t) and, hence, fσ is a ﬂow assignment on 〈(N, E),u, 〉.
(⇐) Assume that f : E → R0 is a ﬂow assignment on 〈(N, E),u, 〉, and let V be its value. In particular, since all edge
capacities and lower bounds are integral, we can assume, w.l.o.g., that f is integral as well (see, e.g., [22]). That is,
f (e) ∈N, for each e ∈ E . Based on f , we now build a succession of transformations σin, σ1, . . . , σV , where σin and σi ,
for each i ∈ {1, . . . , V }, are subsequences deﬁned as follows:
• For each good g ∈ G , σin exactly contains f (s, g)–Uin(g) transformations 〈∅,O〉 ∈ T such that O(g) > 0. In particular,
the relative order of application of these transformations is immaterial.
• Note that, since the value of f is V and since f is integral, we are guaranteed that there are V (not necessarily
distinct) paths, i.e., succession of edges, π1, . . . ,πV from s to t such that for each edge e ∈ E , (e) |{πi | e occurs
in πi}| u(e). Indeed, each path πi serves the purpose of routing one unit of ﬂow from s to t . In particular, for each
i ∈ {1, . . . , V }, observe that πi is of the form (s, g), π¯i, (g′, t), where g and g′ are two goods in G , and where π¯i is a
(possibly empty, if g = g′) path deﬁned over the goods in G only. The idea is to deﬁne σi as the succession of the
transformations that are naturally associated with π¯i , and which is in fact obtained by replacing each edge of the
form (g¯, g¯′) occurring in π¯i with a transformation 〈I,O〉 ∈ T such that I(g¯) > 0 and O(g¯′) > 0.
Observe now that σin can be actually executed, and after it, the auctioneer holds f (s, g) units of good g , for each
g ∈ G . Moreover, for each i ∈ {1, . . . , V }, the succession σi implements a (possibly empty) sequence of transformations
for one of these goods. After σi , the good initially owned by the auctioneer after σin is then possibly transformed in
another good and no further transformation is applied on it. In particular, note that all the transformations of the form
σi can be actually executed, since for each edge of the form (g, g′), l(g, g′) |{πi | (g, g′) occurs in πi}| u(g, g′) =
|〈I,O〉 ∈ T | I(g) > 0 ∧O(g′) > 0|. Moreover, after that σV is executed, the auctioneer holds f (g, t) units of good g ,
for each g ∈ G . Since, f (g, t) (g, t) = Uout(g) holds, we have that σin, σ1, . . . , σV is a solution to A.
After the claim above, the result in the case of free disposal easily follows, as the existence of a ﬂow assignment on a ﬂow
network can be decided in polynomial time (see [22]).
In order to conclude the proof, we observe that the case of lack of free disposal can be faced with a simple adaptation
of the above construction. Indeed, we have just to modify the upper bound M(g), by setting it to the value |〈I,∅〉 ∈
T | I(g) > 0|, and thereby guaranteeing that any surplus of good g can be produced only if there is some transformation
that is prepared to consume it. Then, the result can be established by following precisely the same line of reasoning as in
the proof of the claim above, and by noticing that the novel upper bound guarantees that the auctioneer ends up exactly
with the desired Uout(g) units of good g , after that up to |〈I,∅〉 ∈ T | I(g) > 0| surplus units of g are consumed by
transformations producing as output no goods. As an example, Fig. 6 shows the modiﬁed ﬂow network for the instance A¯
and an admissible solution where the auctioneer ends up exactly with one unit of g′ . Note that the ﬂow depicted in the
left part of Fig. 5 is not admissible w.r.t. the modiﬁed network. 
Let us now turn to the scenario where every type of good is consumed by one transformation at most, i.e., let us assume
that output degrees are unitary at most.
Theorem3.14.On the class COR(∞,∞,∞,∞,∞,1) restricted to instances deﬁned over singleton sets of transformations, Feasibility
is in P.
Proof. Let A= 〈G,T ,Uin,Uout〉 be a MMUCA such that A ∈ COR(∞,∞,∞,∞,∞,1). Let UG be the multi-set of goods the
auctioneer owns (initially, UG = Uin). Let Ta ⊆ T be the multi-set of transformations that are active (initially, Ta = {〈I,O〉 ∈
T | Uin(g) I(g),∀g ∈ G}). Consider the approach where we arbitrarily pick and execute a transformation 〈I,O〉 ∈ Ta , until
the set Ta is empty, and update the variables as follows:
• UG(g) := UG(g) − I(g) +O(g),∀g ∈ G;
• T := T \ {〈I,O〉};
• Ta := {〈I ′,O′〉 ∈ T | UG(g) I ′(g),∀g ∈ G}.
Note that the approach takes polynomially many steps at most, each one feasible in polynomial time. Then, we claim
that there is a solution toA under the free disposal assumption ⇔ when Ta is empty, UG(g) Uout(g),∀g ∈ G.
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(⇒) Assume that A admits a solution σˆ , and let σ be the sequence of transformations picked as discussed above. Note that
the execution of any transformation 〈I,O〉 ∈ Ta does not invalidate the possibility of executing other transformations
in Ta , because output degrees are unitary (at most). Thus, each transformation in σˆ also belongs to σ , and the order
of their execution is immaterial. Since the goods the auctioneer wants to end up with are not required in input by any
transformation (because the output degree is unitary), the fact that σ might contain more transformations than σˆ is
irrelevant.
In the case of lack of free disposal, it is easily seen that the only difference is that, when the algorithm stops, we must
check whether UG(g) = Uout(g), ∀g ∈ G . 
In the case where every type of good is produced by one transformation at most, tractability can be established under
the free disposal assumption.
Theorem3.15.On the class COR(∞,∞,∞,∞,1,∞) restricted to instances deﬁned over singleton sets of transformations, Feasibility
is in P under the free disposal assumption.
Proof. Let A= 〈G,T ,Uin,Uout〉 be a MMUCA such that A ∈ COR(∞,∞,∞,∞,1,∞).
A transformation 〈I,O〉 ∈ T is said necessary w.r.t. a good g ∈ G if: (a) O(g) > 0; or (b) there is a transformation
〈I ′,O′〉 ∈ T such that O′(g) > 0, and 〈I,O〉 is necessary w.r.t. some good g′ such that I ′(g′) > 0. Let Tn ⊆ T denote the
multi-set of all the transformations that are necessary w.r.t. some good g with Uout(g) > 0.
Moreover, as in the proof of Theorem 3.14, let UG be the multi-set of goods the auctioneer owns (initially, UG = Uin),
and let Ta ⊆ T be the set of transformations that are active (initially, Ta = {〈I,O〉 ∈ T | Uin(g) I(g),∀g ∈ G}).
We deﬁne an algorithm that arbitrarily picks and executes an active transformation 〈I,O〉 ∈ Ta ∩ Tn , until Tn ∩ Ta = ∅,
by updating the variables as follows:
• UG(g) := UG(g) − I(g) +O(g),∀g ∈ G;
• Tn := Tn \ {〈I,O〉};
• T := T \ {〈I,O〉};
• Ta := {〈I ′,O′〉 ∈ T | UG(g) I(g),∀g ∈ G}.
We now claim that there is a solution toA under the free disposal assumption ⇔ the algorithm stops because Tn = ∅, and in the
ﬁnal step UG(g) Uout(g),∀g ∈ G.
(⇐) Assume that the algorithm stops because Tn = ∅. Assume that in the ﬁnal step UG(g)  Uout(g),∀g ∈ G . Then, by
construction, the sequence of transformations picked as discussed above is a solution to A.
(⇒) Suppose that A admits a solution. Observe that, at each step, the selection of the transformation that has to be
executed, among all the active transformations in Tn , is immaterial, since every type of good is produced by one
transformation at most and since all the transformations in Tn are necessary for producing the goods required by the
auctioneer, as there is no transformation producing the types of goods initially owned by the auctioneer (because the
input degree is unitary). Thus, all transformations in Tn must belong to any solution sequence. In fact, a solution to A
might contain some further transformations that are not necessary for satisfying the requirements of the auctioneer.
Yet, if A admits a solution, then it admits a solution containing no unnecessary transformations, which will be hence
detected by the algorithm.
To conclude, just notice that the algorithm is feasible in polynomial time. 
Under the lack of free disposal, the class COR(∞,∞,∞,∞,1,∞) is not an island of tractability for Feasibility, as we
have already observed in Theorem 3.9 and in Theorem 3.10. An interesting open question is whether Feasibility is tractable
on the class COR(1,1,k,k,1,k), for some ﬁxed constant k—see, again, Fig. 2.
3.4. Tractable instances for XOR-bids over singleton sets of transformations
We now conclude the analysis of the scenario where bids are deﬁned over singleton sets of transformations by consid-
ering the case of XOR-bids. Firstly, we observe that the proof of Theorem 3.15 can easily be adapted to cope with XOR-bids,
based on the fact that executing necessary transformations is mandatory as to solve the instance at hand. Thus, if some
necessary transformation cannot be executed because of some given XOR-condition, then no solution exists.
Theorem 3.16. On the class CXOR(∞,∞,∞,∞,1,∞) restricted to instances deﬁned over singleton sets of transformations,
Feasibility is in P under the free disposal assumption.
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while the tractability on CXOR(1,1,k,k,1,k), for some ﬁxed constant k, is open. However, tractability can be established by
focusing on unitary output degree, as shown next.
Theorem3.17.On the class CXOR(∞,∞,∞,∞,1,1) restricted to instances deﬁned over singleton sets of transformations, Feasibility
is in P under the lack of free disposal assumption.
Proof. Let A = 〈G, {L1, . . . ,Ln},Uin,Uout〉 be a MMUCA instance that belongs to the class CXOR(∞,∞,∞,∞,1,1). Let
T =⋃n=1 bids(L) denote the multi-set of all transformations occurring in A—recall that, given our interest in Feasibility
and in the setting where atomic bids are restricted over singleton sets of transformations, any XOR-bid can be viewed as
an expression t1 XOR t2 XOR . . . XOR tk , where ti is a transformation (rather than an atomic bid), for each 1 i  k. Let
T f ⊆ T be the multi-set of all the transformations that are not implementable due to some XOR-bid (initially, T f = ∅).
Moreover, let UG , Ta ⊆ T , and Tn ⊆ T be the multi-sets as in the proof of Theorem 3.15.
Observe that, since A ∈ CXOR(∞,∞,∞,∞,1,1) holds, any transformation 〈I,O〉 ∈ T exactly occurs in one XOR-bid in
{L1, . . . ,Ln}, which we denote by xor(〈I,O〉).
Consider the following two-steps approach. In the ﬁrst step, we arbitrarily pick and execute an active transformation
〈I,O〉 ∈ (Ta ∩ Tn) \ T f that is not forbidden by the XOR-bids, until (Ta ∩ Tn) \ T f = ∅, by updating the variables as follows:
• UG(g) := UG(g) − I(g) +O(g),∀g ∈ G;
• Tn := Tn \ {〈I,O〉};
• T f = T f ∪ bids(xor(〈I,O〉));
• T := T \ {〈I,O〉};
• Ta := {〈I ′,O′〉 ∈ T | UG(g) I(g),∀g ∈ G}.
In the second step, we consume all surplus goods as long as it is possible. Hereinafter, we assume that T , UG , and
T f are those computed in the last iteration of the ﬁrst step. Let Ti ⊆ T be the multi-set of all transformations that are
implementable starting from the surplus goods (initially, Ti = {〈I,O〉 ∈ T | (UG(g)–Uout(g))  I(g)}). Then, we arbitrarily
pick and execute an implementable transformation 〈I,O〉 ∈ Ti \ T f that is not forbidden by the XOR-bids, until Ti \ T f = ∅,
by updating all the variables as follows:
• UG(g) := UG − I(g) +O(g),∀g ∈ G;
• T := T \ {〈I,O〉};
• Ti := {〈I ′,O′〉 ∈ T | (UG(g)–Uout(g)) I ′(g),∀g ∈ G};
• T f = T f ∪ bids(xor(〈I,O〉)).
We now claim that there is a solution toA under the lack of free disposal ⇔ the algorithm stops with Tn = Ti = ∅ and UG(g) =
Uout(g),∀g ∈ G.
(⇐) Assume that, when the algorithm ends, Tn = Ti = ∅ and UG(g) = Uout(g),∀g ∈ G . Then, by construction, the sequence
of transformations picked as discussed above is a solution to A.
(⇒) Suppose that A admits a solution. Observe that, at each iteration of the ﬁrst step, the selection of the transformation
that has to be executed, among all the active transformations in Tn is arbitrary, since each type of good is produced
by one transformation at most and since all the transformations in Tn are necessary for producing the goods required
by the auctioneer. Moreover, the order in which the transformations that belong to Ti are executed is immaterial since
each type of good is consumed by one transformation at most and all the transformations in Ti are necessary to
consume the surplus goods obtained by implementing the transformations in Tn . Thus, all transformations in Tn and
in Ti must belong to any solution sequence. Indeed, if some transformation in Tn or Ti cannot be executed due to
some XOR-bids, some required good cannot be produced or some surplus good cannot be consumed. In fact, note that
a solution to A might contain some further transformations that are not necessary for producing the required goods
and, thus, some additional transformations for consuming the surplus goods possibly produced by these unnecessary
transformations. Anyway, if A admits a solution, then it admits a solution containing no unnecessary transformations,
which will be hence detected by the algorithm.
To conclude, note that the algorithm takes polynomial time. 
3.5. Feasibility for arbitrary sets of transformations
In this section, we complete the picture of the complexity of Feasibility, by focusing on the general scenario where
bids can be deﬁned over arbitrary sets of transformations. Of course, all hardness results provided for singleton sets of
transformations still hold in this more general setting. Thus, in the following, we shall just illustrate NP-hardness results
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straightforwardly adapting, or even just inspecting, those illustrated above, and hence details are omitted.
Concerning the hardness results, we observe that any transformation of the form 〈I,O〉 with |{g | g ∈ G , I(g) > 0}| > 0
(i.e., with input variability greater than 1), can be equivalently reformulated in terms of an atomic bid 〈B, p, type〉 with
type = full and B = {〈{},O〉} ∪ {〈{g}, {}〉 | I(g) > 0}. Indeed, B precisely prescribe to produce all the goods in O and to
consume each good g in I . In fact, this transformation does not affect any parameter of the game, but the input variability
that is now guaranteed to be unitary. Hence, we can strengthen Theorem 3.5, Theorem 3.9, and Theorem 3.12.
Theorem 3.18. Feasibility is NP-hard under the free disposal assumption, even when restricted to the class C(1,1,1,1,2,2). More-
over, it is NP-hard under the lack of free disposal, even when restricted to the class C(1,1,1,1,1,2).
Concerning tractability results, observe the proofs of Theorem 3.15 and Theorem 3.16 can be easily adapted to deal
with bids over arbitrary sets of transformations, by deﬁning a transformation as necessary if it occurs in some bid with
type = full together with a transformation that is in its turn necessary (and, of course, by focusing on the smallest set
of necessary transformations, given the circularity of the deﬁnition). With this modiﬁcation in place, the following result
derives by inspecting such proofs.
Theorem 3.19. On the classes COR(∞,∞,∞,∞,1,∞) and CXOR(∞,∞,∞,∞,1,∞), Feasibility is in P under the free disposal
assumption.
Let us now conclude our analysis by extending to the case of arbitrary sets of transformations the two approaches
discussed in the proofs of Theorem 3.14 and Theorem 3.17, respectively.
Theorem 3.20. On the class COR(∞,∞,∞,∞,∞,1), Feasibility is in P.
Proof (Sketch). Let A be a MMUCA instance in COR(∞,∞,∞,∞,∞,1). The algorithm for deciding the Feasibility of A
works in several subsequent iterations. At each iteration, active transformations are executed, until one exists. In particular,
we avoid the execution of those transformations that have been executed in some previous iterations and that violated
some bid constraints (indicated in the following as forbidden transformations).
Formally, let UG be the multi-set of goods the auctioneer owns (initially, UG = Uin), let Ta ⊆ T be the multi-set of
transformations that are active (initially, Ta = {〈I,O〉 ∈ T | Uin(g) I(g),∀g ∈ G}), and let T f ⊂ T be the multi-set of for-
bidden transformations (initially, T f = ∅). Then, each iteration consists in arbitrarily picking and executing a transformation
〈I,O〉 ∈ Ta \ T f , until the set Ta \ T f is empty, and updating the variables as follows:
• UG(g) := UG(g) − I(g) +O(g),∀g ∈ G;
• T := T \ {〈I,O〉};
• Ta := {〈I ′,O′〉 ∈ T | UG(g) I ′(g),∀g ∈ G}.
At the end of the iteration, if no bid constraint has been violated (i.e., for each bid 〈B, p, type〉 with type = full, all
transformations in B have been executed), the algorithm stops and the requirements of the auctioneer are checked (i.e., if
UG(g) Uout(g),∀g ∈ G). Otherwise, T f is updated by adding all transformations that have been implemented in the last
iteration and that occur in some bid with type = full together with a transformation that has not been executed. In this
latter case, the algorithm is reiterated, by initializing again UG , Ta , and T .
By exploiting the line of reasoning in the proof of Theorem 3.14, in the light of the fact that the order of execution of
activities is Ta is immaterial and that transformations in T f cannot occur in any solution, we can conclude that there is a
solution toA under the free disposal assumption⇔when the algorithm stops UG(g) Uout(g),∀g ∈ G. The same line of reasoning
can then be extended to the class COR(∞,∞,∞,∞,∞,1) in case of lack of free disposal with the only difference that,
when the algorithm stops, we must check whether UG(g) = Uout(g),∀g ∈ G . 
Theorem 3.21. On the class CXOR(∞,∞,∞,∞,1,1), Feasibility is in P under the lack of free disposal assumption.
Proof. [Proof Sketch] To establish the result we can follow the same line of reasoning as in the two-steps algorithm ex-
ploited in the proof of Theorem 3.17, provided the following adaptations. In the ﬁrst step, we must adopt the deﬁnition of
necessary transformations exploited for establishing Theorem 3.19. And, in the second step, we must consider a multi-set
Treq of required transformations with the same approach as in the proof of Theorem 3.20, by eventually checking whether
all of them can be executed. 
4. Graph-based structural restrictions do not help
Many NP-hard problems in different application areas, ranging, e.g., from Constraint Satisfaction to Database Theory, are
known to be eﬃciently solvable when restricted to instances that can be modeled via (nearly)acyclic graphs. Indeed, on
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these kinds of instances, solutions can usually be computed via dynamic programming, by incrementally processing the
acyclic structure, according to some of its topological orderings. Therefore, one may naturally expect that these structural
restrictions are also beneﬁcial to isolate tractable MMUCAs. The question is investigated in the following.
Let A be a MMUCA instance over a set G of goods, and let Tr denote the multi-set of all transformations occurring in
its bids. Interactions in A are modeled by considering two different graph structures:
• The transformations graph of A, denoted by TG(A), is a directed graph (Nt , Et) where nodes are in one-to-one corre-
spondence with transformations in Tr (i.e., th ∈ Nt if and only if th = 〈Ih,Oh, ph〉 ∈ Tr ), and where there is an edge
(ti, t j) ∈ Et from ti = 〈Ii,Oi, pi〉 to t j = 〈I j,O j, p j〉 if there exists a good g ∈ G such that I j(g) > 0 and Oi(g) > 0. The
undirected version of TG(A) is denoted by TG(A).
• The goods graph of A, denoted by GG(A), is a directed graph (Ng, Eg) where nodes are in one-to-one correspon-
dence with the goods in G , and where there is an edge (g, g′) ∈ Eg from g to g′ if there exists a transformation
〈Ih,Oh, ph〉 ∈ Tr such that Ih(g) > 0 and Oh(g′) > 0. The undirected version of GG(A) is denoted by GG(A).
Example 4.1. Consider again the setting discussed in Example 1.1 (then, formalized as the MMUCA instance A¯ in Exam-
ple 2.2) and the supply chain graphically illustrated in Fig. 1. The transformations graph TG(A¯) and the goods graph GG(A¯)
are graphically reported on the right and on the left of Fig. 7, respectively. Note that both graphs, as well as their undirected
versions, are acyclic. 
Our ﬁrst result is very bad news on directed and undirected transformations graphs, and on directed goods graphs. The
result holds under the free disposal assumption and under the lack of free disposal.
Theorem 4.2. Feasibility is NP-complete, even when restricted to the classes {A | TG(A) is acyclic} (and, hence, {A | TG(A) is
acyclic}) and {A | GG(A) is acyclic}, and under atomic bids deﬁned over singleton sets of transformations.
Proof. Let Φ = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cm be a Boolean formula over the variables X1, . . . , Xn satisfying the conditions in Lemma 3.2, and
let A(Φ) = 〈G,T ,Uin,Uout〉 be the MMUCA instance over atomic bids (deﬁned over singleton sets of transformations) such
that: G =⋃ni=1{Xi, XTi , X Fi } ∪ {c1, . . . , cm} ∪ {cij | Xi occurs in c j}, Uin = {X1, . . . , Xn}, Uout = {c1, . . . , cm}, and T =⋃ni=1 Ti .
In particular, for each variable Xi occurring positively in the clauses cα and cβ while occurring negatively in cγ , the set Ti
consists of the set of transformations {〈{Xi}, {XTi }〉, 〈{Xi}, {X Fi }〉, 〈{XTi }, {ciα, ciβ}〉, 〈{X Fi }, {ciγ }〉, 〈{ciα}, {cα}〉, 〈{ciβ}, {cβ}〉, and
〈{ciγ }, {cγ }〉}. An illustration of Ti is reported on the left of Fig. 8, where transformations have been indexed for the sake of
readability. Recall that deciding Feasibility over the class of instances of the form A(Φ) is NP-hard, under the free disposal
assumption (Theorem 3.3) and under the lack of free disposal (Theorem 3.8). We next show that such a class of instances
is a subset of the classes {A | TG(A) is acyclic} and {A | GG(A) is acyclic}.
On the top-right part of Fig. 8, the portion of the transformations graph TG(A(Φ)) associated with the transformations
in Ti is reported, which we ﬁnd useful to denote by TG(Ti). Note that no cycle occurs in TG(Ti), even when we consider
its undirected version. Moreover, consider now two arbitrary transformations ti ∈ Ti and t j ∈ T j , and note that there is no
good g ∈ G produced by ti and consumed by t j , or vice versa. In fact, only goods of the form c1, . . . , cm can in principle be
shared between ti and t j , but in any case they will produced by both ti and t j and there is no transformation consuming
them. It follows that TG(A(Φ)) and TG(A(Φ)) are both acyclic.
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Finally, on the bottom-right part of Fig. 8, the portion of the good graph GG(A(Φ)) associated with the goods ma-
nipulated by transformations in Ti is reported, which we ﬁnd useful to denote by GG(Ti). As observed above, for two
arbitrary transformations ti ∈ Ti and t j ∈ T j , GG(Ti) and GG(T j) might share goods in the set {c1, . . . , cm}. However, as
these goods are produced and never consumed by transformations in T , any node in {c1, . . . , cm} contains some incoming
edge, but no outgoing edges in GG(A(Φ)). It follows that GG(A(Φ)) is acyclic. However, note that GG(A(Φ)) is not acyclic
in general. 
Note that the above result is interesting in the light that instances with (directed) acyclic goods graphs correspond to
transformation processes (cf. [4]). Thus, transformation processes emerge to be as hard as arbitrary trades and exchanges of
goods.
We conclude this section by noticing that an NP-hardness result can be obtained even on the remaining class {A |
GG(A) is acyclic}. In this case, differently from the proof of Theorem 4.2, we shall exploit a reduction from a weakly NP-
hard problem (as in Theorem 3.10), and it remains open whether a strongly NP-hardness can be obtained.
Again, the result below holds under the free disposal assumption and under the lack of free disposal.
Theorem 4.3. Feasibility is in NP-complete when restricted to the classes {A | GG(A) is acyclic} and under atomic bids deﬁned over
singleton sets of transformations.
Proof. Recall that deciding whether there is a way to partition a bag S = {s1, s2, . . . , sn} of integers into two bags S1 and S2
such that the sum of the numbers in S1 equals the sum of the numbers in S2 is the NP-complete Partition problem [21].
Let m = ∑ni=1 si , and consider the MMUCA instance A(S) = 〈G,T ,Uin,Uout〉 such that: G = {α, S ′}, Uin(α) = m/2,
Uout(S ′) = m/2 and T = ⋃ni=1{〈⋃sii=1{α},⋃sii=1{S ′}〉}. Then, it is immediate to check that there is a solution to A(S) if,
and only if, Partition has a solution on input S . Indeed, each solution to A(S) is in one-to-one correspondence to a subset
of integers of S whose sum is m/2. Eventually, note that the graph GG(A(S)) is acyclic since it contains the edge over α
and S ′ only. 
5. Tractable WINNER-DETERMINATION
Now that the complexity of the basic Feasibility problem has been analyzed, we can turn to isolate tractable classes
for the Winner-Determination problem. To this end, we ﬁrst observe that all the hardness results we have derived for
Feasibility as well as all hardness results for classical combinatorial auctions (see, e.g., [23]) are inherited by Winner-
Determination on MMUCAs. Thus, in order to isolate classes of instances where Winner-Determination is tractable, we
must avoid the sources of complexities that emerged so far in our analysis or that are known from the literature.
5.1. Bounded intricacy and (acyclic) hypergraph encodings
Let AC = 〈G, {L1, . . . ,Ln},Uin,Uout〉 be a MMUCA instance, let B=⋃n=1 bids(L) be the multi-set of all its atomic bids,
and let Tr be the multi-set of all transformations occurring in B. For the sake of presentation, each element in B (resp., Tr )
is associated with a unique identiﬁer bi (resp., t j) with 1 i  |B| (resp., 1 j  |Tr |), so that we can conveniently refer
to sets of identiﬁers rather than to multi-sets of elements. Then, the auction hypergraph AH(AC) = (N, H) is the hypergraph
whose set N of nodes is such that N = T ∪ B , where T = {t1, . . . , t|Tr |} and B = {b1, . . . ,b|B|}, and whose hyperedges in H
are deﬁned as follows:
(1) For each good g ∈ G , H contains the hyperedge {t j | t j = 〈I,O〉 ∈ Tr and I(g) +O(g) > 0} over the transformations
requiring or producing g .
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(2) For each atomic bid bi = 〈B, p, type〉 ∈B and for each transformation t j ∈ B, H contains the hyperedge {bi, t j}.
(3) If C=XOR, then for each bid L , with  ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, H contains the hyperedge {bi | bi ∈ bids(L)} over the atomic bids
involved in it.
Note that the above encoding generalizes the one proposed in [6] for classical combinatorial auctions, which in fact
consists of the hyperedges of type (1) only.
Example 5.1. Consider the MMUCA instance A¯ = 〈G¯, B¯, U¯in, U¯out〉 discussed in Example 2.2. Recall that {t1, . . . , t6} is the
set of all transformations in A¯, and let bi denote the bid over the transformation ti , for each i ∈ {1, . . . ,6}. The associated
auction hypergraph AH(A¯) is shown in Fig. 9—for the moment, ignore the dashed hyperedge. Note, for instance, that AH(A¯)
contains the hyperedge {t1, t2}, as these two transformations both produce as output a drive train. 
An important structural property of hypergraphs is acyclicity. A hypergraph H is acyclic iff it has a join tree [24]. A join
tree JT(H) for a hypergraph H is a tree whose vertices are the hyperedges of H such that, whenever the same node X ∈ V
occurs in two hyperedges h1 and h2 of H, then X occurs in each vertex on the unique path linking h1 and h2 in JT(H).
Note that the notion of acyclicity we use here is the most general one in the literature, also known as α-acyclicity. As an
example, the hypergraph on the left of Fig. 9 is acyclic, as it is witnessed by the join tree on the right.
Unfortunately, the acyclicity of the associated auction hypergraph is not alone a guarantee for tractability. For instance,
one can easily check that the NP-hardness proof of Theorem 4.3 is established over a class of instances whose underlying
auction hypergraphs are acyclic. As the proof is based on scenarios where a “large” number of transformations produce or
consume the same “small” set of goods, it is natural to look for combining acyclicity with a further bound on the number
of transformations producing a given good g (as to control its availability in any solution), plus either a bound on the
maximum quantity of g that can be produced over all solutions, or a bound on the number of transformations requiring g
(as to control the consumption of g).
The above bounds are formalized via the measure of intricacy of an instance AC = 〈G, {L1, . . . ,Ln},Uin,Uout〉, denoted
by intr(AC), which we deﬁne as the value:
max
g∈G






∣∣{〈I,O, p〉 | I(g) > 0}∣∣
})
.
The main result in this section is to show that MMUCA instances with (nearly)acyclic auction hypergraphs and with
intricacy bounded by some ﬁxed natural number are tractable. The result is shown by encoding MMUCA instances in terms
of constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) instances, and by subsequently exploiting known structural tractability results in this
latter setting. Note that the technique is essentially the one adopted by [6] to solve classical combinatorial auctions over
structurally-restricted classes of instances (cf. [25,26]), and it is here extended to deal with MMUCAs.
5.2. From MMUCAs to CSP instances
We start by recalling some preliminaries on constraint satisfaction. The reader interesting in expanding on this formalism
is referred to [27].
A CSP instance is a triple J = 〈Var,U ,C〉, where Var is a ﬁnite set of variables, U is a ﬁnite domain of values, and
C = {C1,C2, . . . ,Cq} is a ﬁnite set of constraints. Each constraint Cv , for 1  v  q, is a pair (Sv , rv), where Sv ⊆ Var is a
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the allowed combinations of simultaneous values for the variables in Sv . A substitution from a set of variables V ⊆ Var to
U is extensively denoted as the set of pairs of the form X/u, where u ∈ U is the value to which X ∈ V is mapped. The
restriction of a substitution θ : V → U over a set S ⊆ V of variables is denoted by θ[S]. A solution to J is a substitution
θ : Var → U such that θ[Sv ] ∈ rv holds, for each v with 1 v  q. The structure of a CSP instance J is best represented by
its associated hypergraph H(J ) = (V , H), where V = Var and H = {S | (S, r) ∈ C}.
Given the instance AC = 〈G, {L1, . . . ,Ln},Uin,Uout〉 where B is the multi-set of all atomic bids and Tr is the multi-set
of all transformations occurring in B, we deﬁne CSP(AC) = 〈Var,U ,C〉 as the CSP instance such that:
• Variables are associated with (the identiﬁers of) the transformations and the bids in AC , that is, Var = {t1, . . . , t|Tr |} ∪{b1, . . . ,b|B|}.
• The domain U consists of the set {0,1, . . . , |Tr |} of natural numbers. Accordingly, substitutions from Var to U have the
following intuitive meaning. A “transformation” variable t j taking value α > 0 (resp., α = 0) means that t j is executed
at the α-th step of a sequence witnessing the existence of a solution to AC (resp., is not executed). A “bid” variable
bi taking value 1 (resp., 0) means that bi is accepted (resp., not accepted) by the auctioneer. In the following, for a
substitution θ , let σθ be the sequence of transformations such that t j occurs at the α-th position of σθ (resp., does not
occur in it) if t j/α ∈ θ and α > 0 (resp., α = 0). Moreover, let Bθ be the set of bids {bi | bi/1 ∈ θ}.
• The set C contains constraints of four types:
(1) For each good g ∈ G , C contains the constraint Cg = (Sg, rg) such that Sg = {t j | t j = 〈I,O〉 ∈ Tr and I(g) +
O(g) > 0} and where rg is deﬁned as follows. For a substitution θ , we say that σθ = 〈I1,O1〉, . . . , 〈Ir,Or〉 is a feasi-
ble outcome forAC w.r.t. g if mc−1  Ic(g), for each c ∈ {1, . . . , r}, where m0 = Uin(g) and mc =mc−1+Oc(g)−Ic(g).
In the case of lack of free disposal (resp., under the free disposal assumption), we furthermore require that
mr = Uout(g) (resp., mr  Uout(g)) holds. Then, rg consists of all substitutions θ : Sg → U where σθ is a feasible
outcome for AC w.r.t. g . Note that if the intricacy intr(AC) is bounded by some given ﬁxed constant, then the
number of substitutions in rg , i.e., the size |rg |, is polynomial.
(2a) For each atomic bid bi = 〈B, p,partial〉 ∈ B and each transformation t j ∈ B, C contains the constraint Cbi ,t j =
(Sbi ,t j , rbi ,t j ) such that Sbi ,t j = {bi, t j} and where rbi ,t j = {{bi/0, t j/0}, {bi/1, t j/0}, {bi/1, t j/1}, . . . , {bi/1, t j/|Tr |}}.
Note that |rbi ,t j | = 2+ |Tr |.
(2b) For each atomic bid bi = 〈B, p, full〉 ∈ B and each transformation t j ∈ B, C contains the constraint Cbi ,t j =
(Sbi ,t j , rbi ,t j ) such that Sbi ,t j = {bi, t j} and where rbi ,t j = {{bi/0, t j/0}, {bi/1, t j/1}, . . . , {bi/1, t j/|Tr |}5}. Note that|rbi ,t j | = 1+ |Tr |.
(3) If C = XOR, then for each bid L , with  ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, C contains the constraint CL = (SL , rL ) such that SL ={bi | bi ∈ bids(L)} and where rL contains the substitution where each variable is mapped to 0, plus all possible
substitutions where exactly one variable is mapped to 1 and the remaining ones are mapped to 0. Note that |rL | =
1+ n.
The crucial properties of the above correspondence from MMUCA instances to CSP instances are formalized below.
Lemma 5.2. LetAC be a MMUCA instance. Then, the following properties hold:
(A) If intr(AC) k, for some ﬁxed natural number k > 0, then CSP(AC) can be built in polynomial time; in particular, each constraint
relation contains polynomially many substitutions.
(B) AH(AC) =H(CSP(AC)), i.e., the hypergraph associated withAC coincides with the hypergraph associated with CSP(AC).
(C) IfB′ is a solution toAC , then there is a solution θ to CSP(AC) such thatBθ =B′ .
(D) If θ is a solution to CSP(AC), thenBθ is a solution toAC .
Proof. Property (A) can be easily seen to hold by checking the sizes of the various constraint relations, as we have already
pointed out while deﬁning constraints of types (1), (2a), (2b), and (3). The fact that AH(AC) =H(CSP(AC)) holds straight-
forwardly follows from the deﬁnition of the constraints scopes of CSP(AC), which precisely coincides with the hyperedges
of AH(AC)—scopes of type (2a) and (2b) correspond to hyperedges of type (2), whereas scopes of types (1) and (3) corre-
spond to hyperedges of types (1) and (3), respectively. Then, we have to focus on showing the correctness of the encoding,
established via (C) and (D). Let us ﬁrst consider the case where AC = 〈G, {L1, . . . ,Ln},Uin,Uout〉 is such that L is an atomic
bid, for each  ∈ {1, . . . ,n}.
(C) Assume that B′ is a solution to AC , and let σ = 〈I1,O1〉, . . . , 〈Ir,Or〉 be the sequence of transformations associated
with B′ and satisfying the conditions illustrated in Deﬁnition 2.1. Consider the substitution θ : Var → U for CSP(AC) =
〈Var,U ,C〉 such that σθ = σ , Bθ = B′ , and bi/0 ∈ θ , for each bi /∈ B′ . We claim that θ is a solution to CSP(AC), i.e.,
it satisﬁes constraints of types (1), (2a), and (2b). Indeed, because of condition (3) in Deﬁnition 2.1, σθ is a feasible
outcome for AC w.r.t. any good g , and hence θ[Sg] ∈ rg . That is, constraints of type (1) are satisﬁed. Concerning the
constraints of type (2a), just notice that, by condition (2) in Deﬁnition 2.1, for each transformation t j/α ∈ θ with α > 0
belonging to a bid bi = 〈B, p,partial〉, we have that bi/1 ∈ θ . Thus, these constraints are also satisﬁed. Finally, note
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only if, t j occurs in σ for each transformation t j ∈ B. Thus, θ[{bi}] = 1 (resp., θ[{bi}] = 0) implies that θ[{t j}] > 0 (resp.,
θ[{t j}] = 0). It follows that θ[Sbi ,r j ] ∈ rbi ,t j . Hence, constraints of type (2b) are also satisﬁed.
(D) Let θ be a solution to CSP(AC). Because of the constraints of types (1), (2a), and (2b) we have that Bθ (and the
associated sequence σθ ) satisﬁes conditions (3), (2), and (1) in Deﬁnition 2.1, respectively. Indeed, constraints of type (1)
enforce that σθ is a feasible outcome for AC w.r.t. any good g . Constraints of type (2a) guarantee that if a transformation
t j occurs in σθ and is such that t j ∈ B with bi = 〈B, p, type〉, then the bid bi belongs to Bθ . And, ﬁnally, constraints
of type (2b) enforce that if a bid bi = 〈B, p, full〉 occurs in Bθ , then all its transformations belong to the sequence σθ .
Thus, Bθ is a solution to AC .
To complete the proof, we have to consider the cases where AC is deﬁned over OR-bids and XOR-bids. In fact, the former
case precisely coincides with the scenario where all bids are atomic, as OR-bids do not actually provide further constraints.
For the latter case, instead, we have just to notice that constraints of type (3) precisely guarantee that for each bid L , with
 ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, at most one atomic bid in L can be accepted by the auctioneer. Thus, they correctly enforce the semantics
of XOR-bids. 
With the above lemma in place, the ﬁnal ingredient we need is to equip CSP instances with weights as to properly
encode the goal of the auctioneer wishing to the maximize the revenue over all the possible solutions.
An instance of a constraint satisfaction optimization problem (CSOP) consists of a pair 〈J ,w〉, where J = 〈Var,U ,C〉
is a CSP instance and where w : Var × U → R is a weighting function mapping substitutions for individual variables to
real numbers, which we assume to be explicitly listed in the input. For a substitution {X1/u1, . . . , Xn/un}, we denote by
w({X1/u1, . . . , Xn/un}) the value ∑ni=1 w(Xi,ui). Then, a solution to a CSOP instance 〈J ,w〉 is a solution θ to J such that
w(θ) w(θ ′), for each solution θ ′ to J . The hypergraph H(〈J ,w〉) associated with 〈J ,w〉 is H(J ).
Given the instance AC = 〈G, {L1, . . . ,Ln},Uin,Uout〉, we now deﬁne CSOP(AC) as the constraint satisfaction optimization
problem over the instance CSP(AC) and the weighting function w(AC) such that: w(AC)(bi,1) = p, for each atomic bid
bi = 〈B, p, type〉 in AC , and w(AC)(X,u) = 0 for each other substitution X/u. Note that the following is immediate, by
Lemma 5.2 and by the construction of CSOP(AC).
Lemma 5.3. LetAC be a MMUCA instance. Then, the following properties hold:
• IfB′ is an optimal solution toAC , then there is a solution θ to CSOP(AC) such thatBθ =B′ .
• If θ is a solution to CSOP(AC), thenBθ is an optimal solution toAC .
We can eventually conclude the exposition by showing the tractability of MMUCA instances over acyclic structures having
bounded intricacy.
Theorem 5.4. For any ﬁxed natural number k > 0,Winner-Determination can be solved in polynomial time on any class of MMUCA
instancesAC such that AH(AC) is acyclic and intr(AC) k.
Proof. After Lemma 5.2, it is immediate that if the intricacy is bounded by some ﬁxed natural number, then we can build in
polynomial time a constraint satisfaction optimization problem instance CSOP(AC), which is in particular such that AH(AC)
is acyclic if, and only if, CSOP(AC) is acyclic. Solutions to acyclic CSOP instances can be computed in polynomial time (see,
e.g., [6,25,26]). The result then follows as solutions to CSOP(AC) one-to-one correspond with optimal solutions to AC , by
Lemma 5.3. 
5.3. Beyond acyclic hypergraphs
Many attempts have been made in the literature for extending the good results about acyclic CSP instances to relevant
classes of nearly acyclic structures. We call these techniques structural decomposition methods, because they are based on
the “acyclicization” of cyclic (hyper)graphs. Indeed, these methods are aimed at transforming any given cyclic instance into
an equivalent acyclic one, by organizing its atoms or variables into a polynomial number of clusters, and by arranging
these clusters as a tree, called decomposition tree. The original instance is then evaluated via this tree, with a cost that is
exponential in the cardinality of the largest cluster, also called width of the decomposition, and polynomial if the width is
bounded by some constant.
In fact, those positive results for constraint satisfaction that hold over acyclic instances can be straightforwardly extended
to classes of nearly acyclic ones for which a decomposition tree can be eﬃciently computed. As an important application,
we consider here the hypertree decomposition [28].
For any hypergraph H, we denote its nodes and edges by N (H) and E(H), respectively. A hypertree for a hypergraphH is
a triple 〈T ,χ,λ〉, where T = (N, E) is a rooted tree, and χ and λ are labeling functions, which associate each vertex p ∈ N
with two sets χ(p) ⊆N (H) and λ(p) ⊆ E(H). For a set of edges H ⊆ E(H), N (H) denotes the set ⋃h∈H h. If T ′ = (N ′, E ′)
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is a subtree of T , we deﬁne χ(T ′) =⋃v∈N ′ χ(v). We denote the set of vertices N of T by vertices(T ). Moreover, for any
p ∈ N , T p denotes the subtree of T rooted at p.
Deﬁnition 5.5. (See [28].) A hypertree decomposition of a hypergraph H is a hypertree HD = 〈T ,χ,λ〉 for H satisfying the
following conditions:
(1) for each edge h ∈ E(H), there exists p ∈ vertices(T ) such that h ⊆ χ(p), and h ∈ λ(p);
(2) for each node Y ∈N (H), the set {p ∈ vertices(T ) | Y ∈ χ(p)} induces a (connected) subtree of T ;
(3) for each p ∈ vertices(T ), χ(p) ⊆N (λ(p));
(4) for each p ∈ vertices(T ), N (λ(p)) ∩ χ(T p) ⊆ χ(p).
The width of a hypertree decomposition 〈T ,χ,λ〉 is maxp∈vertices(T ) |λ(p)|. The hypertree width hw(H) of H is the mini-
mum width over all its hypertree decompositions. 
Example 5.6. Let A¯′ be the MMUCA obtained by modifying the instance A¯ in Example 5.1 in a way that transformations t1
and t2 both produce as an output a dynamo, and by leaving unchanged all the other transformations and bids. As t4 also
produces a dynamo, the auction hypergraph AH(A¯′) is the one shown in Fig. 9, including the dashed hyperedge modeling
the fact that t1, t2 and t4 interact by producing the some output. Note that the modiﬁed hypergraph is not acyclic. A 2-width
hypertree decomposition HD= 〈T ,χ,λ〉 of AH(A¯′) is reported in Fig. 10. 
The classes of CSP instances having bounded hypertree width have the same desirable computational properties as acyclic
CSPs [29]. Indeed, from a CSP instance J = 〈Var,U ,C〉 and a hypertree decomposition HD of H(J ) of width h, we may
build an acyclic CSP instance J ′ = 〈Var,U ,C〉 with the same solutions as J . The overall cost of deciding whether J is
satisﬁable is in this case O (m × h × rhmax × log rmax), where rmax denotes the size of the largest constraint relation and m is
the number of vertices of the decomposition tree, with m |Var| (in that we may always ﬁnd decompositions in a suitable
normal form without redundancies, so that the number of vertices in the tree cannot exceed the number of variables of
the given instance). To be complete, if the input consists of J only, we have to compute the decomposition, too. This
can be done with a guaranteed polynomial-time upper bound in the case of hypertree decompositions [28]. Putting these
arguments together with Theorem 5.4, the following result is established.
Theorem 5.7. For any pair of ﬁxed natural numbers h > 0 and k > 0, Winner-Determination can be solved in polynomial time on
any class of MMUCA instancesAC such that hw(AH(AC)) h and intr(AC) k.
6. Conclusion
The problem of identifying tractability islands for mixed multi-unit combinatorial auctions has been faced, by comple-
menting tractability results that were obtained in the literature for classical combinatorial auctions. In particular, a clear
picture of the computational complexity of MMUCAs instances has been depicted under structural and qualitative restric-
tions, which characterize interactions among bidders and types of bids involved in the various transformations, respectively.
The analysis of the computational complexity of MMUCAs is an important prerequisite to deﬁne eﬃcient solution ap-
proaches. On the one hand, from our analysis, a number of settings emerged to be NP-hard. In these cases, it is unlikely
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able heuristics that well-behave in practice. On the other hand, a signiﬁcant number of other settings turned out to be
tractable. In these cases, it has to be noticed that our proofs are constructive and, hence, immediately provide eﬃcient
solution algorithms, which would be relevant to implement and test on real scenarios.
Moreover, it is relevant to point out that the problems we analyzed in the context of supply-chain formation via MMUCAs
can be abstractly seen as synthesis problems, where bids can be seen as playing the role of computational units (i.e., the
tasks to be executed) and goods can be seen as representing descriptions, such as ontological ones, for their inputs and out-
puts. These problems frequently occur in the context of service oriented computing, where software applications are built by
automatically composing and conﬁguring existing (web) services (see, e.g., [30–32]). More generally, similar issues emerge
in the synthesis of workﬂow models [33]. This is a problem that is currently receiving renewed interest because of its appli-
cation to workﬂow management systems supporting declarative process models, where users are just in charge of deﬁning
the goal of the process in terms of a description of the required outputs as well as of deﬁning the pre-conditions and post-
conditions for the various tasks [34]. Eventually, the results discussed in this paper can be also applied to analyze biological
processes [35] in general, and metabolic pathways [36] in particular, which encode biochemical reactions involving enzymes
and metabolites. A metabolic reaction requires as input some metabolites and produces as output other metabolites. In this
context, metabolic reactions can be mapped to bids and metabolites to goods.
Therefore, while being stated in the context of MMUCAs, the results we derived in this paper found application in
the above settings, too. In particular, the techniques we have deﬁned to identify islands of tractability based on structural
restrictions can be used to identify islands of tractability in such synthesis problems, too. Moreover, concerning such struc-
tural tractability issues, we point out that our approach is based on encoding the semantics underlying MMUCAs in terms
of constraint satisfaction problems. In fact, CSPs are “static” in nature, and therefore an ad-hoc encoding approach has been
proposed to deal with the dynamism of our setting. Note that this approach can be well used to model via CSP instances
different dynamic environments, where in particular the analysis is restricted to a polynomially-bounded or even just ﬁxed
time horizon. This is, for instance, the case of certain planning problems (see, e.g., [37]) or of reasoning problems over
acyclic process models.
From a technical viewpoint, there are a few issues that remained open, namely to check whether strongly NP-com-
pleteness results can be proven in Theorem 3.10 and Theorem 4.3, and to assess whether Feasibility is tractable on the class
COR(1,1,k,k,1,k), for some ﬁxed constant k. From a more general perspective, instead, it would be interesting to embark
on the implementation of the approaches we have exhibited to single out islands of tractability, and on the deﬁnition of
solution algorithms for arbitrary MMUCA instances, which take advantage of structural and qualitative properties that hold
over portions of them. In addition, an other interesting avenue of further research is to analyze the complexity of MMUCAs
for more involved kinds of bidding languages, where for instance bidders’ preferences or time constraints [19] are taken
into account.
Appendix A
Lemma 3.2. Satisﬁability is NP-hard, even on classes of Boolean formulas in conjunctive normal form where each variable occurs
positively in two clauses and negatively in another, and where each clause contains three literals at most.
Proof. Recall that Satisﬁability is NP-hard, even if each clause contains three literals at most [21]. Moreover, w.l.o.g., we
can assume that the same variable occurs at most once in each clause, and that each variable occurs at least in two clauses.
Let Φ = c1 ∧ · · · ∧ cm be a Boolean formula in conjunctive normal over the variables X1, . . . , Xn form satisfying the above
conditions. Based on Φ , we have to show how to build an equivalent formula Φ ′ (i.e., such that Φ is satisﬁable if, and only
if, Φ ′ is satisﬁable) where each variable occurs positively in two clauses and negatively in another, and where each clause
still contains three literals at most.
For each 1 j m, let c j be a clause of Φ and let c′j be the clause obtained by replacing in it each variable Xi with the
fresh variable Xki , where k is the number of clauses belonging to the set {c1, . . . , c j} where Xi occurs (either positively or
negatively). Moreover, for each variable Xi , let mi  2 be the total number of clauses where it occurs and, for each 1 i  n
and 1 kmi , let ci,k be the clause (Xki ∨ ¬X (k+1) mod mii ). Finally, consider the formula Φ ′ such that






By construction, Φ ′ is now deﬁned over the variables in the set {Xki | 1 i  n,1 k mi}. Moreover, in any satisfying
truth assignment either all variables in {X1i , . . . , Xmii }, for each 1 i m, evaluate true or they all evaluate false, because of
the clauses of the form ci,k . Thus, Φ and Φ ′ are equivalent.
Eventually, to conclude the proof, observe that each variable Xki occurs in exactly three clauses. In particular, it occurs
positively in ci,k and negatively in ci,(mi+k−1) mod mi . Moreover, Xki occurs in a clause of the form c
′
j , either positively or
negatively. It follows that if there is no variable of the form Xk that negatively occurs in a clause of the form c′ , then Φ ′i j
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Xki occurring negatively in a clause of the form c
′
j , we have just to substitute each occurrence of X
k
i (resp., ¬Xki ) with ¬Xki
(resp., Xki ). The resulting formula is, of course, still equivalent to Φ , while satisfying the condition that each variable occurs
positively in two clauses and negatively in another. As a ﬁnal remark, note that all clauses contain three literals at most. 
Lemma 3.7. exact-1 Satisﬁability is NP-hard, even on classes of Boolean formulas in conjunctive normal form where each variable
occurs positively in two clauses and negatively in another, and where each clause contains three literals at most.
Proof. Recall that exact-1 Satisﬁability is NP-hard, even if each clause exactly contains three literals (problem ONE-IN-
THREE 3SAT in [21]), and hence is each clause contains three literals at most. W.l.o.g., assume that the same variable occurs
at most once in each clause, and that each variable occurs at least in two clauses. Let Φ = c1 ∧· · ·∧ cm be a Boolean formula
in conjunctive normal over the variables X1, . . . , Xn form satisfying the above conditions. Let Φ ′ be the Boolean formula
built in the proof of Lemma 3.2 over the variables in {Xki | 1 i  n,1 k mi}, and recall that Φ ′ and Φ are equivalent,
that each variable occurs in Φ ′ positively in two clauses and negatively in another, and that each clause in Φ ′ contains
three literals at most.
Observe now that in any satisfying assignment for Φ ′ , each clause of the form ci,k , for each 1  i  n and 1  k mi ,
contains one literal that evaluates true and another that evaluate false. Recall also that in any satisfying truth assignment,
either all variables in {X1i , . . . , Xmii }, for each 1  i m, evaluate true or they all evaluate false. By combining the above
two observations, we can conclude that there is a satisfying assignment for Φ ′ such that, for each clause, exactly one literal
evaluates true if, and only if, there is a satisfying assignment to Φ enjoying the same property. 
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